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VOL. XLVI

NOVEMBER, 1954

NO. 6

Published at the UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, Madison, Wisconsin

Monatshefte

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Published under the auspices of the Department of German at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.; issued monthly with the exception of the months of June, July, August, September, and bimonthly April and May.


The annual subscription price is \$3.00; all foreign subscriptions 50 cents extra; single copies 50 cents.

Correspondence, manuscripts submitted for publication, and books for review should be sent to the editor: J. D. Workman, Bascom Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison 6, Wisconsin.

Subscriptions, payments, and applications for advertising space should be addressed: *Monatshefte*, Bascom Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison 6, Wis.

Manuscripts should be prepared in accordance with the *MLA Style Sheet*, copies of which may be obtained from the Treasurer of the MLA (6 Washington Square North, New York 3, N. Y.). Price: 25 cents each.

Ten reprints will be furnished gratis to authors of articles; additional reprints will be furnished at 10 cents apiece.



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Entered as second class matter April 15, 1928, at the post office at Madison, Wisconsin, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

Monatshefte

FÜR DEUTSCHEN UNTERRICHT,
DEUTSCHE SPRACHE UND LITERATUR

Official Organ of the German Section of the Central States
Modern Language Teachers Association

Volume XLVI

November, 1954

Number 6

MUSIL'S "ERDENSEKRETARIAT DER GENAUIGKEIT UND SEELE", A CLUE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HERO OF "DER MANN OHNE EIGENSCHAFTEN."

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The recent partial translation of Musil's outstanding novel "Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften" brought forth a large number of reviews, and though the reviewers tried to do justice to the work, most of them failed in their attempt to interpret the novel.¹ Admittedly theirs was a difficult task. The translation covers one fifth of the whole novel, roughly one half of the first volume, and stops abruptly at chapter seventy-two, leaving the plot undeveloped, and most problems unsolved. Even if the reviewers had gone back to the original they would have been stymied by the mere size of the work. Musil's novel covers a world in almost two thousand pages. Moreover its peculiar style, clear and lucid on the surface, yet in reality profound and highly intellectual, makes for difficulty. Granting all these obstacles, it is yet disheartening to have one critic say of Ulrich, the hero of Musil's novel, that he is "all but incomprehensible"² and another that Ulrich's qualities, which according to the title of the novel he is not even supposed to have, "defy definition."³ Unfortunate misreadings of Musil's work such as these renew the challenge to attempt an interpretation which will clear away some of the difficulties. One alternative to grappling with the whole novel is to select one cardinal aspect of the book, in this case the philosophy of its main character, and try to analyze it in the hope that such a partial examination will illumine the work as a whole. In this new light the novel should appear both clearer and more readable.

Musil's hero Ulrich (we never learn his last name), is a very presentable young man of 32, of independent means, a free-lance mathematician, the son of a professor of jurisprudence who had been ennobled for his

¹ the brilliant review by Prof. Hans Meyerhoff in the January 54 number of *Partisan Review* is an exception.

² Hugh Puckett, "Robert Musil", *Monatshefte*, XLIV (1952), p. 413

³ Heinz Politzer, rev. of Robert Musil, "The man without qualities", *Commentary*, January 1954, p. 56

services to the crown. The action of the novel revolves within the framework of a patriotic planning committee, designed to arrange for a fitting celebration of the 70th anniversary of Emperor Francis Joseph's ascension to the throne. In the book these plans begin to crystallize late in 1913, with the wishful hope that the four-year interval until 1918, the date of the anniversary, will provide sufficient time in which to prepare a celebration in keeping with the glorious reign of the monarch. In his gentle irony Musil calls it the "Parallelaktion" for he wishes to characterize the indolence of his fellow-Austrians who had belatedly conceived the idea only after the Prussians, their upstart competitors in the national and international field, had already launched with their usual competence a scheme to celebrate a "mere" thirty years' jubilee of their own Kaiser Wilhelm II. This, too, is planned for 1918. Since the purpose of the celebration is to give to the world a proper expression of the validity of Austrian culture, an elaborate machinery is slowly set in motion. Meetings of select personalities are called, headed by the ultra-aristocratic Count Leinsdorf. These are designed to bring forth the great unifying idea which the 20th century has not yet produced, and which the committee desires to spread abroad in grateful recognition of the 70-year reign. To Musil the discussions of the Parallelaktion serve as a means to depict the political and cultural disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as well as the barrenness of its intellectual elite, who are desperately trying to re-define the lasting values of Austrian, and by implication, of European culture.

Ulrich has become the honorary secretary of the planning committee, not because he has a real desire for it, but rather because his father, greatly worried about his son's apparently wasted life, has interceded with Count Leinsdorf on his behalf. Yet of all the participants he alone is capable of making a clear, even if somewhat ironic statement of objectives for the Parallelaktion. These aims Ulrich first formulates in a conversation with Leinsdorf at one of the innumerable meetings which take place in the Salon of Ulrich's beautiful middle-class cousin Diotima:

"Erlaucht," sagte er "es gibt nur eine einzige Aufgabe für die Parallelaktion: den Anfang einer geistigen Generalinventur zu bilden! Wir müssen ungefähr das tun, was notwendig wäre, wenn ins Jahr 1918 der Jüngste Tag fiele, der alte Geist abgeschlossen werden und ein höherer beginnen sollte. Gründen Sie im Namen Seiner Majestät ein Erdensekretariat der Genauigkeit und Seele; alle anderen Aufgaben sind vorher unlösbar oder nur Scheinaufgaben!"⁴

This seems to be a central thought in Ulrich's world. What does he mean by this obscure suggestion of an earthly secretariat of precision and "soul"? An analysis of this could very well provide the key to Musil's novel.

⁴ Robert Musil, *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*, Rowohlt Verlag, Hamburg, 1952. All other page references to the novel relate to this edition.

At the outset Ulrich is introduced as a free-lance mathematician. Yet curiously enough his career had started in the army and had also included some engineering. This advance from an essentially concrete interest to a rather speculative existence, so very much like Musil's own life which included these very phases, permits us to see in Ulrich the spokesman for the author's very own ideas. Ulrich is Musil. His opinions and idiosyncrasies, his dreams and ideals are those of Musil. Ulrich's very unusual career, with its sudden changes and interruptions, reveals not only a mind independent in the extreme and a power of making decisions completely unaffected by any social or mundane considerations, but also a growing preoccupation with pure thinking. Ulrich is not only a scientist by profession, he has also evolved a scientific philosophy of life which permeates his every thought. Thus Ulrich is not only objective, precise and unbiased in his scientific work; he thinks inductively on every subject. Ulrich rejects all preconceived notions, be they in religion, philosophy or morals, and attempts to shape a philosophy of life wholly of his own. Such an extreme individualism causes Ulrich to adopt a certain aggressiveness towards whatever ideas he considers old-fashioned and outmoded. His attitude makes little of the mores and conventions of society unless they conform to rational findings and can stand his personal, invariably ruthless, scrutiny.

Ulrich asserts, as one of the participants in the *Parallelaktion* puts it, "die . . . Gesinnung, das Leben müsse sich dem Geist anpassen." (p. 553). That is to say, he stipulates the unquestioned supremacy of the intellect and of science over all phases of human life. Such a view implies a continuous effort, a never-ending quest after improvement, and a readiness to change one's findings at a moment's notice once these findings have been superseded by new experiences.

It is Ulrich's friends, aware of his particular views, who coin the name "Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften" for him. On a very superficial level they want thus to characterize the "nondescript quality" of Ulrich's appearance. "Das ist der Menschenschlag, den die Gegenwart hervorgebracht hat." (p. 65). And they refer to his appearance as so "allgemein intelligent" that it could be that of a doctor, a merchant, a painter or a diplomat, an appearance which precludes guessing the man's professions. "Ein Mathematiker sieht nach gar nichts aus; das heisst, er wird so allgemein intelligent aussehen, dass es keinen einzigen bestimmten Inhalt hat." (p. 66). What Ulrich lacks is, according to his friends, the outward appearance which proclaims the depth and strength of his association with his calling, that medieval aspect of man's estate which stipulates that even his apparel should proclaim him. Just because he is "nondescript", Ulrich embodies the modern, scientific age to his friends. They further consider his anonymity indicative of a mental state which knows as little about "real life" "wie die Menschen, wenn sie sich dereinst statt von Fleisch und Brot von Kraftpillen nähren werden, noch von Wiesen und jungen Kälbern und Hühnern wissen dürften." (p. 66). A mathematician

of Ulrich's caliber has, if one may believe his friends, reached emotionally that highly abstract state where he is incapable of sensuous enjoyment. And they charge him with failing to appreciate the simple pleasures of life, such as food, domesticity and music, which do in fact mean very little to Ulrich.

It is left to Walter, Ulrich's close friend, to explain the concept of the man without qualities more fully. He sums up Ulrich in the following terms:

"Wenn er zornig ist, lacht etwas in ihm. Wenn er traurig ist, bereitet er etwas vor. Wenn er von etwas gerührt wird, lehnt er es ab. Jede schlechte Handlung wird ihm in irgendeiner Beziehung gut erscheinen. Immer wird für ihn erst ein möglicher Zusammenhang entscheiden, wofür er eine Sache hält. Nichts ist für ihn fest. Alles ist verwandlungsfähig, Teil in einem Ganzen, in unzähligen Ganzen, die vermutlich zu einem Überganzen gehören, das er aber nicht im geringsten kennt. So ist jede seiner Antworten eine Teilantwort, jedes seiner Gefühle nur eine Ansicht, und es kommt ihm bei nichts darauf an, was es ist, sondern nur auf irgendein danebenlaufendes 'wie es ist', irgendeine Zutat, kommt es ihm immer an." (p. 66).

Walter then charges Ulrich with an estrangement from reality in favor of larger scientific concepts. Ulrich does not judge and evaluate his experiences in terms of the experience itself, but always in terms of another, larger concept, in terms of "möglicher Zusammenhang", in terms of "irgendeine Zutat." Obviously Walter refers to Ulrich's complete subordination of his intellectual and emotional life to his scientific and thus inductive world-view.

Musil contrives to let Ulrich give us a closer explanation of his way of living. During the interval between the meetings of the Parallelaktion Ulrich takes his beautiful cousin Diotima on an excursion, and thorough scientist that he is, he does not see the landscape, the rocks, the trees, the plants: he sees only everlasting change and flux. It is difficult for Ulrich to be aware of static reality. "Das Gefühl, einen festen Boden unter den Füßen und eine feste Haut um mich zu haben, das den meisten Menschen so natürlich erscheint, ist bei mir nicht stark entwickelt," he says to Diotima. (p. 297).

Ulrich, a scientist intensely aware of constant change, depreciates the static present. He tries to explain to his cousin:

"Wir überschätzen masslos das Gegenwärtige, das Gefühl der Gegenwart, das, was da ist; ich meine, so wie Sie jetzt mit mir in diesem Tale da sind, als ob man uns in einen Korb gesteckt hätte, und der Deckel des Augenblicks ist daraufgefallen. Wir überschätzen das" (pp. 296-7).

Ulrich can only say that he has a different attitude to experience. It is different from that of most people who seem to live within the "shut basket" of a static present. The term "die Wirklichkeit abschaffen",

which Ulrich constantly uses in connection with this theme can thus only mean an even stronger immersion in the permanent movement of life and nature and a negation of the artificially created sense of the static present.

Thus Musil's term "der Mann ohne Eigenschaften" actually includes a number of different concepts. On the superficial level it pertains to Ulrich's general intelligent appearance, making him the representative of modern, scientific man. It also refers to his lack of appreciation for the mundane, sensual things of life, with which his friends charge him. In addition it is indicative of Ulrich's inability to enjoy an experience for its own sake, and its subordination to larger concepts. And finally, it comes to include Ulrich's negation of the static present and his program for an immersion in the eternal flux of nature.

By what means does Musil manage to portray Ulrich's progressive acceptance of life in flux? A true hero must have a motivating force in life. For Ulrich this force is an Utopian philosophy. It is through the elaboration and, later, the conscious adoption of such a philosophy — treated in numerous chapters of the book — that Ulrich realizes his true potential. Ulrich is Musil's "Möglichkeitsmensch" par excellence. That is to say, Ulrich depreciates the real in favor of the possible. He does not concern himself much with that which happens, but continuously thinks of that which could, should, or ought to happen. In his ideas Ulrich is not petty, nor he is restricted to "wirkliche Möglichkeiten", real possibilities, that is events and developments that are founded on the basis of present experience. Rather, his thought is sweeping, true to the tradition of the great scientific thinkers, who were all in a sense great artists: he envisages "mögliche Wirklichkeiten", possible new realities. Ulrich does not consider his utopian ideas idle imagination. They are constructed out of sound scientific principles and lack not practical bases, but rather the proper temperament in order to be materialized. He feels that his philosophy is not an escape from the present, but rather an attempt to shape the future after his own image. Thus he thinks of the world and of mankind in terms of a big laboratory. "So wie eine grosse Versuchsstätte, wo die besten Arten Mensch zu sein, durchgeprobt und neu entdeckt werden müssten, hatte er sich früher das Leben gedacht, wenn es ihm gefallen sollte." (p. 156). In Ulrich's world laboratory people will no longer live by our old deductive morality and ideals, they will not believe in obsolete, never proved generalities, but their own experience will furnish them with truths arrived at inductively. Musil coins for Ulrich the term "hypothetisch leben", by which he means to characterize an experimental attitude to living "wo jeder Schritt ein Wagnis ohne Erfahrung ist." (p. 256). In such a highly individualistic philosophy the philosopher, i.e. Ulrich, remains the final judge and arbiter of his own thought. He cannot accept anything as final, perfect or certain. Thus Ulrich tries to retain an open mind. He

avoids ties of any sort. In order to be receptive to all new experiences he will not acquire a definite status, a profession, a wife. Even if these experiences should go beyond that which by common consent is intellectually and morally acceptable, he will not shun them.

To this philosophy which rejects a final, static insight but features a continuous "becoming", Musil gives the name "Essayismus". Ulrich wants to think of his life in terms of a literary essay which treats a subject from many angles without ever being able to grasp it so completely that it contracts into a concept. Musil's Essayismus is not a method of progressive choice in which any conviction may eventually come to be accepted as truth, "der vor- oder nebenläufige Ausdruck einer Überzeugung, die bei besserer Gelegenheit zur Wahrheit erhoben, ebensogut aber auch als Irrtum erkannt werden könnte." (p. 260). It is rather an attempt to experience the tremendous multiplicity in life and to do it justice. Just as an essay is "die einmalige und unabänderliche Gestalt, die das innere Leben eines Menschen in einem entscheidenden Gedanken annimmt" (p. 260), so is this philosophy an unique endeavor to comprehend and give expression to the infinite number of experiences of which man is capable. It is Musil's conscious endeavor to attune his hero to the eternal flux in nature and to immerse him in it, turning away from the static present and embracing an uninterrupted attitude of becoming.

When Musil wants to give the reader an example of his new way of living combining a scientific, experimental attitude, one which subordinates the single event to larger concepts and at the same time embodies Essayismus, that is an attitude of constant choice, of constant becoming, he does so in a discussion on history, aptly entitled "warum erfindet man nicht Geschichte" (p. 366). And he immediately goes on explaining: "Ich sage Geschichte, aber ich meine . . . unser Leben." (p. 371). Musil rejects our passive acceptance of both the events of life and of history. It seems to him that man actively interferes in history only at times of utmost necessity, accidentally, so to speak, "nur wie ein Tier . . . wenn er verwundet ist, wenn es hinter ihm brennt . . . mit einem Wort, nur im Notfall?" (p. 371). Why do we not plan and experiment with our historical processes? Basic to such a change would be what one of Ulrich's friends calls "das Bewusstsein des Versuchs" (p. 650), a conscious adoption of the experimental method. This would entail ruthless planning, but the scientist in Ulrich is not averse to it. Musil feels strongly that we should favor a system of history in which the single even is subordinated to larger concepts. In our observations of history Musil feels, we are too little interested in what happens and far too much in where, when and to whom events happen. We tend to overvalue outward manifestations of historical events and to undervalue their meaning. We are more interested in the "plot" of the historical "play". We fail to create new contents in history and merely try to re-distribute the old. In short,

in our historical development we have not kept pace with our technological progress. "Ich meine," says Ulrich, "es erinnert an einen Stoff, der in tausenden Ballen technisch sehr vollendet erzeugt wird, aber nach alten Mustern, um deren Entwicklung sich niemand kümmert." (p. 650). Essayismus as applied to history means the continued experimental and planned approach to events.

One pole of Ulrich's system of thought revolves thus around the scientific, experimental or essayistic approach to life. Beyond this is a second group of ideas which center around the concept of intensity as a predominant quality of one's experiences. What Musil means by this concept of intensity is briefly this: One's efforts, whether they be moral, emotional, or literary, should not be spread indiscriminately over a wide area, but should be intensified into a small number of actions where they appear "auf das Äusserste gesteigert" (p. 252), intensified to the highest pitch. "Es hiesse also ungefähr soviel wie schweigen, wo man nichts zu sagen hat; nur das Nötige tun, wo man nichts Besonderes zu bestellen hat; und was das Wichtigste ist, gefühllos bleiben, wo man nicht das unbeschreibliche Gefühl hat, die Arme auszubreiten und von einer Welle der Schöpfung gehoben zu werden" (pp. 252-3). Such an idea of intensification of one's actions is expressed in Musil's ideal of a lifework consisting of three actions, three poems, or three essays, (in his own case it was to be the one great novel), as well as in his idea of existence as literature. In one of his discussions with his cousin Diotima, Ulrich explains that characters in literature have so great an appeal for us because in the process of creation their creators have omitted a great deal and intensified the rest. They have omitted the "fat" which makes reality round and unappetizing. Ulrich feels that beauty is only created by this process of omitting and the ensuing course of intensification. Thus our present attitude which dilutes and waters down both emotions and morality engenders that unappetizing mediocrity which is so characteristic of our time. Only children and fools, Ulrich feels, have avoided falling into this trap. In their minds they omit the unnecessary and live intensely and are therefore both happier and unhappier than average people. Ulrich himself wants his life and his experiences to be of such an intense character. His friends mock him and say "(er) sei einer, der nur mit Salz kochen will" (p. 375). The very idea of rest-periods is unbearable to him. If a form of existence is attractive to such a high degree, there can be no need for recreation or interruption. Certainly there are no rest-periods in the "ewigen Seligkeit", in the eternal bliss of heaven. Even the idea of sleep Ulrich admits is at times unpleasant to him. He does not want to punch holes through his intensified life any more than people would riddle a beautiful picture with holes because in its perfect state it is simply too beautiful and makes too great demands on them.

Are there no objections to life at such a high pitch? There are of course. The first, a minor one, points out that if both moral and

emotional life were restricted to moments when our feelings have reached very high intensification, it would to a great extent cease. But Musil counters this objections by suggesting that we adopt a standardization of most of our actions. Such a standardization would be similar to the "Normung von Bleistiften oder Schrauben" (p. 253) and would take care of most of our decisions. It would reserve moral and emotional qualities for such extraordinary events as really need such qualities. The second objection is the major one, and Musil introduces this at the very end of the third volume, after Ulrich's incestuous relationship with his sister Agathe—the supposed consummation of the experimental and intense life—has failed. It contains Musil's realization that life at a high pitch is at odds with our emotional apparatus, since human emotions have constantly to be renewed if they are to be operative. Hence life at a high pitch on the human level appears to be impossible, and this part of the theme of the novel is essentially a failure.

As an utopian theme however, the ideal combination of Essayismus, of constant becoming coupled with what Musil calls "das exakte Leben" (p. 251), with life at a pitch, offers tremendous vistas. An ideal Essayismus, Musil claims, would go beyond the strict scientific attitude of the experiment. It would engender a state which would be beyond both objectivity and subjectivity. It would be somewhat akin to being profoundly moved, akin to the experiences of the mystics, "ein' ganz Begreifen'" (p. 262). As to morality, whatever remained of it would be so intensified and so fantastically powerful that Musil can only call it "zauberhaft beglückend". (p. 253). Again the emotions would be similarly enhanced and the resultant passions would be "etwas Urfeuerähnliches an Güte." (p. 254). Such a state of feeling, capable of rendering bewitching happiness as well as the quintessence of goodness Musil envisages as the logical result of an unequivocal application to both morals and emotions of his philosophy of intensive becoming.

It will now be useful investigate how Musil applies his philosophy of an intensive and experimental mode of behaviour to certain specific aspects of life. We will choose the aspect of morality for the obvious reason that so much space in the novel is devoted to it: Ulrich's interest in the Moosbrugger episode concerning the condemned murderer of a prostitute; in the second and third volume, to the falsifying of a will by Ulrich's sister Agathe; and finally, Ulrich's incestuous relationship with his sister,—all of which offend so very clearly that which is commonly accepted as morality.

What exactly is Ulrich's and thus Musil's ideal of morality? Of Ulrich we know already from his description as *Möglichkeitsmensch* that he has a negative attitude to the world and its laws and conventions, that he is highly individualistic, and that he is quite ready to trespass against that which is commonly accepted as long as he himself approves such a course. This negative attitude to standard morality is in complete

accord with Ulrich's experimental view of life which, like science, should be essentially amoral, a life in which the importance of the inductive experiment means much more than the artificial limit of deductive, obsolete morality. Thus Ulrich's reaction to moral matters is rather indifferent to start with. As to actions themselves, we have already pointed out Ulrich's tendency to evaluate them in terms of larger concepts of "grosser Zusammenhänge". That is to say, Ulrich will never judge any action by itself, but always by the forces which originate it and result from it. Thus a murder will mean to him, as it does to us, either a heroic or a foul deed, depending upon the circumstances which surround it. Unlike us, however, Ulrich goes to extremes and makes the agent, i.e. the murderer, completely dependent upon the circumstances which surround the deed: he makes him actually a pawn in a field of forces. Thus Ulrich centers his judgement on the deed, and not on the doer. He judges only the action, yet action by itself is neutral, it has potentially the makings of both good and evil. Whether Ulrich could now consider an action good or bad, would, according to his views of "grosser Zusammenhänge", depend on its consequences. "Sie (i.e. the actions) waren gewissermassen das, was sie wurden" (p. 258). Thus Ulrich tends to accept a kind of morality, which he eventually comes to call the "Moral des nächsten Schritts" (p. 756), in which each act is judged by the one which logically follows it. Such a system precludes any proper evaluation of a single act.

Thus when the question arises as to whether an act is moral or not Ulrich finds himself in a dilemma. His scientific, experimental attitude is *per se* amoral. Neither his view of an act in which the doer passively depends upon a field of forces, nor his idea of judging an action entirely by its results can provide him with a standard of value. It is then that Ulrich uses his concept of intensity as his new standard of morality. An act, according to Ulrich, is moral, if it springs from the intensive life, if it gushes from emotional fervor, that is, if the doer, being acted upon by the forces of the field, is at the same time lifted up and thus acts in perfect unison with them. Hence to Ulrich there is neither good nor bad, neither crime nor virtue, but only action out of the fullness of emotional life or no emotion at all. Ulrich's view is couched in a statement made by his sister Agathe: "Eigentlich gibt es dann gar kein Gut und Böses, sondern nur Glaube – oder Zweifel!" (p. 779). Glaube is thus the intensive, believing state of action, Zweifel the opposite; Glaube is good, Zweifel is evil. Ulrich agrees. His yardstick as to whether an action is moral or immoral is dependent upon whether or not it was committed in a state of "Glaube", i.e. the intensive state, or whether it has a similar effect on himself. In short, he will ask: does it intensify my life? "Ich glaube", says Ulrich, "man kann mir tausendmal aus den geltenden Gründen beweisen, etwas sei gut oder schön, es wird mir gleichgültig bleiben, und ich werde mich einzig und allein nach dem Zeichen richten, ob mich seine Nähe steigen

oder sinken macht" (p. 787). Thus Ulrich finally comes to adopt a new morality dependent upon the intensive source and intensifying force of an action. Such a morality cannot contain anything lasting, since its extent and duration depend entirely on the intensive and inspired state of life. It certainly cannot have any rigid rules or laws. "Er (i.e. Ulrich) hatte doch gesagt . . . dass feste Regeln dem innersten Wesen der Moral widersprächen und der Glaube höchstens eine Stunde alt werden dürfe" (p. 814).

It is this kind of morality based upon the "intensive" qualities of life which attracts Ulrich to Moosbrugger, the half-insane murderer of a prostitute. For, as Ulrich sees it, in Moosbrugger's act the two elements which constitute an action, the forces of the field and the emotional state of the man, have been in complete unison. In Moosbrugger's action Ulrich sees 'das Bild eines Handelns, worin das Zugreifen, wie es aus der höchsten Erregung folgt, und das Ergriffenwerden in einem unbeschreiblichen gemeinsamen Zustand eins wurden, der Lust von Zwang, Sinn von Notwendigkeit, höchste Tätigkeit von seligem Empfangen nicht unterscheiden liess" (p. 668). From the intensive state follow the "Zugreifen aus höchster Erregung", "Lust", "Sinn", und "höchste Tätigkeit", from the field of forces "das Ergriffenwerden", "Zwang", "Notwendigkeit", und "seliges Empfangen". And in the ideal act the two constituents can not be differentiated. Yet how ominous it is that it is Moosbrugger's action to which Ulrich's new morality applies. It makes a re-thinking of Ulrich's ideas incumbent upon him when they eventually have clearly emerged, as they do at the end of the first volume.

Thus, when the Parallelaktion has almost failed, Ulrich has at least gained sufficient insight to analyze his own personality. During its discussions which provided the intellectual background against which Ulrich developed his philosophy he has come to realize that the basic feeling underlying his philosophy of an intensive life of continuous becoming has been that of a "schonungslosen Leidenschaftlichkeit" (p. 606), of a relentless passion. Such is the basic trait of the man without qualities, the one basic quality out of which all others emerge; the desire to act upon reality in a relentless passion. This has shown itself in his essentially active, hard, sceptical, ruthless and violent attitude to life. This has been at the bottom of his scientific desire to see everything in a larger context, to immerse himself in the flux. This one basic quality has engendered his ideas of the "exakte Leben", of the intensive life, and its morality which approves any action as long as it was committed in an inspired state.

But at the very time Ulrich gains this somewhat shocking insight he becomes equally aware of a serious gap in his emotional qualities. He realizes that this part of his character which is to experience love, affection, tenderness and sensitiveness, "diese vielfältigen Beziehungen des Menschen zu sich und der Natur, die noch nicht rein sachlich sind und


es vielleicht auch nie sein werden," (p. 607), that all these traits have been gravely neglected in the formation of his personality. The result is a completely lopsided disposition in which the relentless passions, the active, appetitive, and animalistic traits completely dominate the passive, longing, and affective ones.

Having reached this conclusion the task for Musil's two remaining volumes now becomes clear. It is to provide the proper equilibrium in Ulrich's character, to create a balance between the relentless passions and the affective soul, to create a new man in which the dominating human characteristics balance each other. That is to say, the second and third (unfinished) volumes must show Ulrich's attempt to build up his affective faculty by applying to himself both his new philosophy of the scientific and experimental as well as his intensive idea of living. Since Ulrich tries to strengthen the passive and affective parts of his character, the basic tendency of that part of the novel will be inactivity, and thus the second and third volumes feature even less plot than the first, but rather a series of long discussions devoted to a most careful, painstaking and elaborate examination of moral and emotional processes. Ulrich wants to develop the sensitive emotions to a degree similar to that of the mystics of old. He is trying to recreate a mysticism in step with the scientific findings of the twentieth century. He characterizes his painstaking self-examination by saying that he looks at the "heiligen Weg mit der Frage . . . ob man wohl auch mit einem Kraftwagen auf ihm fahren könnte!" (p. 767). Thus while the scientific requirements receive their due through a most elaborate and inductive examination of moral and emotional problems, the intensive attitude on the other hand centers around Ulrich's relationship with his sister Agathe. It is in her presence that Ulrich experiences what he comes to call the "andere Zustand", the fullness and intensity of the emotions. For their union represents the ideal balance of the relentless passions and the affective ones, and both Ulrich and Agathe find in each other the complementary traits which their personalities have so badly lacked.

And now at last we are able to analyze Ulrich's suggestion of an earthly secretariat of "Genauigkeit und Seele". It embodies Musil's attempt to apply the findings of science to the phenomena of emotional life, to bring the latter to the level which our intellect has reached, in short to negate the gap of which Ulrich had said earlier that "nichts ist heute so fremd, wie es Strenge und Gefühlsleben einander sind." (p. 502). It is a formula for the new modern man in whom the rational traits are completely balanced, whom the emotive and affective parts of his character are no longer suppressed but achieve a full flowering and unhindered expansion by means of a scientifically free, experimental attitude. "Auf der eine Seite stellt es dunkel die Sehnsucht nach einem Gesetz des rechten Lebens dar, das ehern und natürlich ist, das keine Ausnahme zulässt und keinen Einwand auslöst, das lösend ist wie ein Rausch und nüchtern wie

die Wahrheit:" (p. 843), in short a law or formula which is strictly scientific and sober and yet at the same time "lösend wie ein Rausch", that is to say, it has qualities that are of a mystical, intoxicating, highly affective, emotionally inebriated state. Musil's utopia is based upon a formula for modern man in whom the two main streams of character are finally balanced.

Such is then the scope of Ulrich's philosophy. It attempts to correct the excess of intellect over the emotions which is so characteristic of modern man. And having analyzed the thought of Musil's hero so far, it is now possible to place the novel within this distinguished literary tradition which has concerned itself with the seeming polarity in the soul of man. What makes "the man without qualities" such an important contribution to this discussion is the fact that the author brings to it a penetrating power of analysis coupled with an uncanny awareness of the problems of modern man. Musil approaches the problem in the spirit and with the intellectual resources of the twentieth century. True enough he only provides a theoretic solution; the *Erdensekretariat*. Yet by his thorough elaboration of the problem in modern terms he has made a substantial contribution to the problem of polarity.



MORAL POLARITY IN KAFKA'S "DER PROZESS" AND "DAS SCHLOSS"

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Franz Kafka once said that there exists only a spiritual world, that what we call the material world is the evil in the spiritual one, and that what we call evil is but a necessary moment in our endless development.¹ Kafka, then, in writing of the physical world, writes of evil, of sin, of that transient state of man's moral being in which he is at odds with the ethical absolute of his metaphysical environment. Since he has also told us that there are two cardinal sins, impatience and indolence, from which all the others spring,² we may assume that each of these suggests a prerequisite condition in the individual: in the first instance, an awareness of the existence of an absolute ethic; in the second, an indolence of the spirit which precludes that awareness. Both not only postulate the existence of a supreme morality, but we are constantly reminded that the individual relationship to this authority is exclusively vital. Nevertheless, the protagonists of *Der Prozeß* and *Das Schloß* are shown to have lived oblivious to the existence of authority and law to which all are subject, and of which it is said in *Der Prozeß*: "Es nimmt dich auf, wenn du kommst, und entläßt dich, wenn du gehst."³ One asks logically to what authority and system of laws the individual could be responsible and conformant without knowledge of the extent of his responsibility and the pattern of his conformance? The problem seems clearly transcendental in character. The complex structures of Court and Castle, and the implied system of laws of which they are a projection, are Kafka's symbols for the supreme morality which one may identify with God or any absolute regulative force or system. These novels are chronicles of mortally decisive attempts to understand that supreme force.

It is not accidental that in *Der Prozeß* Josef K. is pictured as awakening from sleep to arrest; his situation is a projection of the following statement: "Jemand sagte mir — ich kann mich nicht erinnern, wer es gewesen ist —, daß es doch wunderbar sei, daß man, wenn man früh aufwacht, wenigstens im allgemeinen alles unverrückt an der gleichen

¹ Franz Kafka, *Hochzeitsvorbereitungen auf dem Lande und andere Prosa aus dem Nachlaß* (New York, 1953), p. 44.

² *Ibid.*, p. 39. Another reference to this volume of the *Gesammelte Werke* will appear parenthetically in the text. It should also be mentioned here that Felix Weltsch, *Religiöser Humor bei Franz Kafka*, "Anhang" to Max Brod, *Franz Kafkas Glauben und Lehre* (Winterthur, 1948), p. 127, notes the point made, but does not examine the two novels (or others of the pertinent minor works) in ascertaining the creative validity of the quoted aphorism.

³ Franz Kafka, *Gesammelte Schriften* (New York, 1946), III, 233. Other references to the *Schriften* will be cited parenthetically in the text by volume number and page.

Stelle findet, wie es am Abend gewesen ist. Man ist doch im Schlaf und im Traum wenigstens scheinbar in einem vom Wachen wesentlich verschiedenen Zustand gewesen . . . Darum sei auch der Augenblick des Erwachens der riskanteste Augenblick im Tag; sei er einmal überstanden, ohne daß man irgendwohin von seinem Platze fortgezogen wurde, so könne man den ganzen Tag über getrost sein" (III, 267). Josef K. regains consciousness to find nothing in the same place. Josef K.'s moment of awakening witnesses a complete alteration of his situation — an alteration which certainly precludes his being at peace with himself the whole day through. Since Josef K.'s awakening and recognition of the existence of authority are coincidental, this awakening may be seen as symbolic of moral unconsciousness or spiritual indolence, the state in which K. lived unaware of the existence of a supreme authority. Paradoxical though it may seem, the very fact that Josef K. is unconscious of guilt is proof of its existence, and with this guilt relative to the fact of K.'s ignorance of the law, it is reasonable to state that his guilt has to do with the fact of his unconsciousness of the existence of the supreme authority, since both law and organization are but projections of that force. The reader should recall the reply of one of the guards to Josef K.'s pleas of ignorance: "Sieh, Willem, er gibt zu, er kenne das Gesetz nicht, und behauptet gleichzeitig, schuldlos zu sein" (III, 16). Viewed logically, the only trespass of which K. can possibly be held guilty at this point is that which Kafka calls the sin of indolence or lethargy, and which I shall call the sin of unconsciousness.

It is most significant in this regard that Josef K. is seen to suffer from periodic lapses into this original sin throughout the course of the narrative, his case being affected adversely in each instance. One recalls K.'s encounter with the "Auskunftgeber" of the Court, a gentleman of greatest importance to him: "Er gibt den wartenden Parteien alle Auskunft, die sie brauchen, und da unser Gerichtswesen in der Bevölkerung nicht sehr bekannt ist, werden viele Auskünfte verlangt. Er weiß auf alle Fragen eine Antwort, Sie können ihn . . . daraufhin erproben" (III, 80). Obviously, this is the chance for which K. has been waiting. However, instead of taking advantage of the magnificent opportunity, K. permits himself to be overcome by weariness. Too, in this connection, we remember K.'s conversation with his uncle, in which the latter expresses so very much concern with his nephew's attitude: "Deine Gleichgültigkeit bringt mich um den Verstand. Wenn man dich ansieht, möchte man fast dem Sprichwort glauben: 'Einen solchen Prozeß haben, heißt ihn schon verloren haben'" (III, 107). K. is here tired and indifferent, and his consciousness of the decisive concern dulled. Further, if one chose to ignore the Freudian point of view, one might regard K.'s experience with Leni in this light. We remember his uncle's reaction to that particular episode: "Du hast deiner Sache . . . schrecklich geschadet. Verkriechst dich mit einem . . . Ding, das überdies

. . . die Geliebte des Advokaten ist, und bleibst stundenlang weg . . . ganz offen, läufst zu ihr . . . und unterdessen sitzen wir beisammen, der Onkel, der sich für dich abmüht, der Advokat, der für dich gewonnen werden soll, der Kanzleidirektor vor allem, dieser große Herr, der deine Sache in ihrem jetzigen Stadium geradezu beherrscht" (III, 121). All of these apparently diverse incidents have one essential element in common. In each of them, K. permits his consciousness of the critical nature of his relationship to the authority to be dulled, be it by fatigue, laziness, or voluptuousness. All imply a diminished consciousness of the supreme concern, and that partakes of the nature of his original sin.

In the opening chapter of *Das Schloss*, we also encounter the theme of "das Gewecktwerden," "das Verhör." Once again, there is pictured the accession to consciousness with corollary radical alteration in the individual existence. Although awareness of the existence of the authority symbolized by the Castle is implied in that K. asserts that he has been summoned to its service, consciousness of its identity and importance is not present, and the initial statement of the problem with which K. will contend is coincident only with his awakening: "Dieses Dorf ist Besitz des Schlosses, wer hier wohnt oder übernachtet, wohnt oder übernachtet gewissermaßen im Schloß. Niemand darf das ohne gräfliche Erlaubnis" (IV, 11). Since K.'s subsequent effort is solely to the end that he obtain permission to live in recognized relationship to the supreme authority, this serves as an initial statement of the problem, so that it may be said that K.'s awakening is coincidental with his realization of the ultimate concern of existence.

Although in the surveyor's instance there is no suggestion, excepting by implication, of a preceding sin of unconsciousness, or at least no accountability for it, it is interesting to note that lapses into this original sin are functional in precisely the same way as in *Der Prozeß*. One thinks of K.'s attempt to waylay Klamm, the official, in the courtyard of the inn. Tired of standing in ambush in the snow, he is seduced by the prospect of abandoning his uncomfortable post and taking his ease in the warm interior of the coach which also waits for Klamm: ". . . nach allen Seiten konnte man sich drehen und strecken, immer versank man weich und warm . . . Der Gedanke, daß er in seiner jetzigen Lage von Klamm lieber nicht gesehen werden sollte, kam ihm nur undeutlich, als leise Störung, zu Bewußtsein" (IV, 125). K. here yields to comfort, to laziness; he permits his concern with the vital issue to be blunted, to come faintly to perception in the form of a vague disquiet. In this position K. is trapped. He has betrayed himself by his lapse into spiritual indolence, and has forfeited possibly the only opportunity that he will have of contact with Klamm. Most significant in this connection is the episode in which K., quite by chance, strays into the bedchamber of Bürgel, one of the secretaries from the Castle. This scene is strongly reminiscent of the episode with the "Auskunftgeber" in *Der Prozeß*, but

is of even greater importance. Says Bürgel: ". . . es gibt aber dennoch trotz allen Vorsichtsmaßregeln für die Parteien eine Möglichkeit, diese nächtliche Schwäche der Sekretäre — immer vorausgesetzt, daß es eine Schwäche ist — für sich auszunützen . . . Sie besteht darin, daß die Partei mitten in der Nacht unangemeldet kommt" (IV, 305). It is then possible that the party may unwittingly be in contact with an official of the organization who has the most intimate knowledge of his individual case — all of which information is immediately available for the asking: "Man muß, ohne sich im geringsten schonen zu können, ihr [der Partei] ausführlich zeigen, was geschehen ist, wie außerordentlich selten und wie einzig groß die Gelegenheit ist, man muß zeigen, wie die Partei zwar in dieser Gelegenheit in aller Hilfslosigkeit . . . hineingetappt ist, wie sie aber jetzt . . . Herr Landvermesser, alles beherrschen kann und dafür nichts anderes zu tun hat, als ihre Bitte irgendwie vorzubringen, für welche die Erfüllung schon bereit ist" (IV, 310 f.). This, of course, is the moment toward which both Josef K. and K., the surveyor, bend all their energies. But — "K. schlief, abgeschlossen gegen alles, was geschah" (IV, 311). The opportunity is forfeited.

With Josef K.'s awakening in *Der Prozeß* symbolic of a rise to moral consciousness, one must conclude that Josef K. is subsequently responsible for his actions in relation to authority to an extent not previously true. This is not to say that the sin of indolence or unconsciousness is thereby made relatively less serious, but rather simply to imply a difference in degree. This view is supported in that Josef K.'s case is considered at all. Were there absolutely no hope for Josef K., the morning of awakening would be the morning of execution. Too, there is emphasis given to the fact that an attitude of humility and acceptance will be of benefit to the accused. Leni, Huld's housekeeper-mistress, remarks to K.: ". . . seien Sie nicht mehr so unnachgiebig, gegen dieses Gericht kann man sich ja nicht wehren . . . Machen Sie doch bei nächster Gelegenheit das Geständnis. Erst dann ist die Möglichkeit zu entschlüpfen gegeben, erst dann" (III, 118 f.). When one considers that Josef K.'s actions, in nearly every instance, are characterized by an attitude of impatience, and that these actions are committed consciously, in full awareness of the existence of the supreme authority, one comes to feel the attitude of impatience decisive in the degree that it is conscious. Held guilty of the sin of indolence, K. is yet proved redeemable through the fact that he is provided a period in which he may act to influence the outcome of the trial. In this period, weight is placed upon the individual's responsibility for his actions.

Within a very few moments after his arrest, we are given an indication of the pattern which is to be characteristic of K.'s future attitude. When told by his warden that he may, if he so chooses, go to his post in the bank as usual, K. seems actually offended: "In die Bank? . . . ich dachte, ich wäre verhaftet." K. fragte mit einem ge-

wissen Trotz" (III, 24). It is precisely this defiance that is so pronouncedly characteristic of K.'s manner at his first hearing, in the course of which he denounces the Court and all that it represents: "Eine Organisation, die nicht nur bestechliche Wächter, läppische Aufseher und Untersuchungsrichter . . . beschäftigt, sondern die weiterhin jedenfalls eine Richterschaft hohen und höchsten Grades unterhält, mit dem zahllosen . . . Gefolge von Dienern, Schreibern . . . vielleicht sogar Henkern, ich scheue vor dem Wort nicht zurück" (III, 55). And what is the immediate result of this exhibition of impatience? He is told that he has forfeited the advantage "den ein Verhör für den Verhafteten in jedem Falle bedeutet" (III, 57 f.). Through impatience, Josef K. has deprived himself of benefit from the first advantage extended him by the organization. Chastised? Not K. A few moments later, he is thinking of revenge upon the judge through his mistress. In this connection, one should recall Leni's previously quoted criticism of K.: "Sie sind zu unnachgiebig . . . Seien Sie nicht mehr so unnachgiebig," and her suggestion that he be more humble and compliant. In the same vein, his lawyer, Huld, states: ". . . fast jeder Angeklagte, selbst ganz einfältige Leute, gleich beim allerersten Eintritt in den Prozeß an Verbesserungsvorschläge zu denken anfangen und damit oft Zeit und Kraft verschwenden, die anders viel besser verwendet werden könnten. Das einzige Richtige sei es, sich mit den vorhandenen Verhältnissen abzufinden" (III, 130 f.). By implication, an attitude of impatience is highly inimical to the welfare of the accused, and the only correct posture involves that very acceptance of which Leni speaks, and which K. finds impossible. Does K. profit by this latest advice? K. impatiently takes matters into his own hands, and imprudently dismisses his advocate. In every instance, Josef K.'s gestures of impatience affect his situation negatively. Too late, K. himself realizes the nature of his error: ". . . das einzige, was ich jetzt tun kann, ist, bis zum Ende den ruhig einteilenden Verstand behalten. Ich wollte immer mit zwanzig Händen in die Welt hineinfahren und überdies zu einem nicht zu billigenden Zweck. Das war unrichtig. Soll ich nun zeigen, daß nicht einmal der einjährige Prozeß mich belehren konnte?" (III, 236). K., unable to fulfill the requirements of humility and acceptance, has rebelled against authority, and has "sich selbst . . . unermesslich dadurch geschadet, daß [er] die besondere Aufmerksamkeit der immer rachsüchtigen Beamtschaft erregt hat" (III, 131).

The element of impatience is even more heavily underlined in *Das Schloss*. As in the instance of Josef K., each of the surveyor's conscious actions in relation to the supreme authority is decisive with reference to his ultimate destiny. Again, as in the case of Josef K., each of these actions for which the individual is in particular degree responsible is charged with impatience. K., too, reveals this posture very early in the narrative. He considers that those in the Castle have "die Kraftver-

hältnisse abgewogen . . . und den Kampf lächelnd [aufgenommen]" (IV, 15). At this point, K. is under the impression that he has been appointed by the Castle to the post of surveyor, hence here, less than at any time, is there question of conflict. In this early manifestation of impatience in the instance of both protagonists K., before other elements in their respective situations are in full play, there is suggested a fundamental human failing. The pattern of impatience is so very typical of K.'s behavior, so much a part of everything that he says and does, that it would be tedious to enumerate incident upon incident. One that projects above all the rest, however, and is important by virtue of its appearance in an accusatory letter having to do with K., and written by an official, refers to K.'s relationship with Frieda, Klamm's mistress: "Des Landvermessers K. Schuld zu beweisen, ist nicht leicht. Man kann nämlich auf seine Schliche nur kommen, wenn man sich . . . ganz in seinen Gedankengang hineinzwingt. . . . Nur aus Berechnung schmutzigster Art hat K. sich an Frieda herangemacht . . . Er glaubte . . . in ihr eine Geliebte des Herrn Vorstandes erobern zu haben und dadurch ein Pfand zu besitzen, das nur zum höchsten Preis ausgelöst werden kann. . . . Da ihm an Frieda nichts, am Preise alles liegt, ist er hinsichtlich Friedas zu jedem Entgegenkommen bereit, hinsichtlich des Preises aber gewiß hartnäckig" (IV, 419 f.). K.'s guilt and his stubborn impatience of spirit are inextricably intertwined. The prize, of course, is the satisfactory resolution of the problem of his relationship to the highest authority, and K. sees in Frieda only a means to that end. Constitutionally unable to realize that the question of his acceptance into this community rests entirely with the supreme authority, K. impatiently attempts to force the issue. One must not think that K. is being persecuted by the authority. He himself admits that the administration has shown itself indulgent to a certain degree, but he "will keine Gnadengeschenke vom Schloß, sondern [sein] Recht" (IV, 92). Yet Frieda rightly tells him that as a stranger he has no rights (IV, 389). There are channels through which it is possible for him to proceed, but he scorns them.

Much of *Das Schloß* is concerned with the relation of a narrative within a narrative, and the space devoted to this story is in direct ratio to its importance. The narrative has to do with the situation of the Barnabas family, to which, for reasons which become obvious, K. is very much attracted. One discovers that the problem which confronts this family is precisely that which K. faces, and arises from the same characteristic failing. The Barnabas family exists in isolation and disgrace because one of the daughters, Amalia, has defied an official of the Castle. Although the authority itself did not act, they were ostracized by the village, which in this closely integrated community is much the same thing. They seek to reestablish their relationship to village and Castle in the same fashion which K. employs: "Hindernisse sind da,

Fragwürdigkeiten, Enttäuschungen, aber das bedeutet doch nur, was wir schon vorher gewußt haben, daß dir nichts geschenkt wird, daß du vielmehr jede einzelne Kleinigkeit selbst erkämpfen muß" (IV, 211). We know from other evidence that if anything of this sort is gained, it is freely given by the Castle, but these people, as does K., feel it necessary to do battle. They are shown, as is K., the error of their ways. They are told that the Castle "konnte doch nicht grob eingreifen in die Entwicklung . . . dem Interesse eines einzelnen Mannes zu dienen . . ." (IV, 246) even though "Es kümmerte sich ja in Wirklichkeit um alles" (IV, 246). The father is even more pointedly told that "er jetzt . . . die Ämter belästige . . . gerade dieses sei unverzeihlich" (IV, 247). Nevertheless, as does K., they continue with their devious stratagems, in spite of the fact that "es den Eindruck erwecken konnte, als ob [sie] der Behörde diktieren wollten" (IV, 261). In all this history, as it is told K., the parallel to his own situation is evident; it is little wonder that he is attracted to the family.

It may be concluded that Kafka concedes a supreme authority and a supreme ethic. The supreme authority may be affronted through conscious rebellion against it, or through simple being without consciousness of its existence. The supreme ethic cannot be known to the transgressor, but he is presumed to be conformant to it. His responsibility is not defined by any conventional law or rational tenet which would hold him responsible for that only which he has done deliberately. There is no dialectical connection, much less harmony, between the morality of the individual and the morality identified with the supreme authority; the dialectic of man is irrelevant in transcendental terms, and that which is supremely relevant is inaccessible. Josef K.'s accession to consciousness is accompanied by realization that a new situation (or a new aspect of an old situation) exists about which it is vitally necessary that he do something. Armed as he is with a dialectic which does not embrace the concept to which he must orient himself, his position is ludicrous. He has no recourse but to act as a representative human being, his actions dictated by human characteristics. Unfortunately, the two sins are characteristically human. In this connection, the remainder of the aphorism cited earlier: "Es gibt zwei menschliche Hauptsünden, aus welchen alle andern ableiten: Ungeduld und Lässigkeit. Wegen der Ungeduld sind sie aus dem Paradiese vertrieben worden, wegen der Lässigkeit kehren sie nicht zurück. Vielleicht aber gibt es nur eine Hauptsünde: die Ungeduld. Wegen der Ungeduld sind sie vertrieben worden, wegen der Ungeduld kehren sie nicht zurück" (*Hochzeitsvorbereitungen*, 39). It is apparent that Kafka feels that these two sins involve elemental human failings, and, as such, are inevitable in their appearance. The fault of indolence is one of moral unconsciousness, unconsciousness of a morality superior to our own. It also includes all of the lesser sins which imply the dulling or obliteration of true

moral consciousness; it is the sin of the sensualists. The fault of impatience is one of moral consciousness; it cannot be committed without conscious relation to a supreme authority; it is an intellectual sin, the sin of the sceptics. As a human characteristic, this sin implies an obligation to rebel, to question. Since Kafka considers it is the sin of the Fall, the repeated projection of this human characteristic in moral terms can have only disaster as the result.

Kafka deals solely with the Judaeo-Christian religious heritage. The sins that he represents are Judaeo-Christian concepts which force into being the opposing concepts of humility and acceptance — certainly Judaeo-Christian in character. When a complete reduction is made, then, we have a Judaeo-Christian polarity of sin and virtue. Kafka's moral equation acquires an illusory vagueness of outline only because of his heavily symbolic emphasis upon the eroding influence of historical time upon the religio-moral tradition which has effected the gradual removal of the individual from a valid frame of moral reference and placed him on his own in relation to the infinite. Removed from this frame, he can only strike out blindly in obedience to the human impulses which brought about his downfall in the beginning.



TEXTPARALLELEN ZUR FRAGE GEORGE UND NIETZSCHE

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Der „offiziellen“ Lesart der Beziehungen Georges zu Nietzsche, die bei den jüngeren Freunden des Dichters, also im sogenannten Georgekreis, gültig war, hat Friedrich Gundolf den frühesten Ausdruck gegeben:

Man hat nun vielfach den Vollender und Zerstörer des Idealismus, den Erben und Umkehrer aller geistigen Bewegungen seit Luther, Nietzsche, als einen unmittelbaren Erzieher Georges betrachtet . . . Nietzsche stellt ein neues Ziel in die höchste Höhe . . . er ersinnt das Andere, das weder er selbst noch seine Zeit schon füllt. George stellt ein gesteigertes Leben dar, das er selbst schon verwirklicht . . . Nur wie jeder höhere Mensch ist heute auch George dem gewaltigen Zersprenger und Befreier verpflichtet, der zuerst in die mörderisch-bürgerliche Stickluft neuen Odem wehte und mit seinen Gewittern überhaupt erst wieder die Atmosphäre schuf, worin große Gedanken und Geschicke gedeihen können.¹

In ähnlichem Sinne äußerte sich Kurt Hildebrandt, der Platoforscher des Georgekreises: „Erst George ist, was zu sein Nietzsche krampfhaft begehrt. Nietzsches Kräfte wachsen aus dem Ekel am Jetzt und Hier, er schafft sein Ideal aus dessen Gegensatz. George ist ganz er selbst, und sein Wirken ist ein Ausstrahlen innerster Kräfte.“²

Friedrich Wolters formuliert diese Beziehung, wie George sie zweifellos selbst gesehen wünschte:³ „Auch Nietzsche war schon früh in den Blättern als deutscher Schriftsteller dem Ausland entgegengehalten worden, aber Georges tieferen Anteil hatte er erst an der Lebenswende gefunden, wo der Seher selbst dem Gorgoantlitz der Zeit gegenüberstand und den furchtbaren Kampf begriff, in dem der einsame Streiter verblutet war.“⁴ Unter der „Lebenswende“ Georges sind das Jahr 1900 und die anschließenden Jahre zu verstehen. Das Nietzsche-Gedicht im *Siebenten Ring* erschien zuerst in der Fünften Folge der *Blätter für die Kunst* (1900/01). Weiterhin schreibt Wolters:

Erst jetzt fühlte er [George] die verwandten Strebungen in ihm [Nietzsche], und wie er für seine Artung schon in der ersten Blätterfolge [1892/93] das wundervolle Wort „Orator“ prägte,

¹ Friedrich Gundolf, *George*, Berlin, 1920, S. 49.

² Kurt Hildebrandt, *Nietzsche als Richter: sein Amt* in Ernst Gundolf und Kurt Hildebrandt, *Nietzsche als Richter unsrer Zeit*, Breslau, 1923, S. 102.

³ Bernt von Heiseler, *Stefan George*, Lübeck, 1936, S. 58: „George wird sein eigener historisch-kritischer Herausgeber und bald auch sein eigener Biograph. Monate verbringt er bei Friedrich Wolters in Kiel, um mit diesem die Geschichte seines Lebens und Wirkens in einem Monumentalwerk festzulegen . . .“

⁴ Friedrich Wolters, *Stefan George und die Blätter für die Kunst*, Berlin, 1930, S. 325. Für Wolters Darstellung der Haltung Nietzsches und Georges zu Hellas und Christentum vgl. *ibid.* S. 364-369.

das ihn weder von der ästhetischen noch der philosophischen Seite, sondern vom Gesamtgeistigen, von seinem Lebenspathos her erfaßte, so sah George auch jetzt vor allem die Größe seiner Menschlichkeit, die Unbedingtheit und Unversöhnlichkeit seines Kämpferwillens und die Lauterkeit eines Geistes, der bis zur martervollen Selbstvernichtung sich jede ausweichende und ausgleichende Lösung versagte . . . Sein Opfer gab dem Dichter den Weg zur Gemeinschaft und Gestaltung frei, die der Lehrer des Übermenschen und der Seelenforscher vergeblich ersehnen mußte. (S. 326)

Es kann mit Sicherheit angenommen werden, daß George schon früh mit den Schriften Nietzsches gründlich bekannt wurde. Wolters berichtet, daß George während seiner Berliner Studienzeit durch die Vermittlung seiner Freundin Ida Coblenz⁵ Fritz Kögel kennen lernte, „den ersten Herausgeber von Nietzsches Werken, der für eine ganze an Nietzsche gebildete Menschenart bezeichnend war . . . (S. 62) George verließ Berlin im März 1891. Er war damals 22 Jahre alt. Ein Beitrag Fritz Kögels, „von der kunst,“ erschien im März 1893 in den *Blättern für die Kunst*, Erste Folge, Band III. Georges Bekanntschaft mit dem Herausgeber Nietzsches ist also nicht flüchtig gewesen.

Im gleichen Sinne wie Gundolf, Hildebrandt und Wolters spricht sich Edgar Salin noch einmal im Jahre 1948 über die Frage George und Nietzsche aus:

Nietzsche gehört nicht im selben Sinne wie Pindar und Platon, wie Dante und Goethe und selbst Shakespeare zu Georges geistigen Ahnen . . . Daraus daß Nietzsches Namen oder Schatten in Georges Gedichten mehrfach wiederkehrt und auch daraus, daß besonders viele Prose-Schriften [sic!] des „Kreises“ Erscheinung und Bedeutung Nietzsches behandeln, ist zu Unrecht auf eine Nietzsche-Nachfolge Georges und seiner Freunde geschlossen worden. Dem aber war nicht so. Wenn Tauben und Toren, die den Warner in Wahn und Tod getrieben hatten, die unheimliche Gewalt des Mächtigen gezeigt – wenn ihnen das Ereignis „Nietzsche“ in Bild und Lehre wachgerufen wurde, so hieß dies weder Ja noch Nein, weder Tadel noch Lob noch gar „Heroisierung,“ sondern nichts Anderes als Versichtbarung des Nicht-Gesehenen.⁶

Diesen Stimmen reiht sich neuerdings der französische Germanist Claude David in seinem umfassenden Werk über den Dichter mit völlig selbständigem und unabhängigem Urteil an:

Gewiß ließe sich in Georges Werk manche Formulierung finden, mit der Nietzsche einverstanden gewesen wäre. Aber selbst in diesen Fällen ist die Zusammenstellung vielleicht trügerisch. Freilich setzt George Nietzsche fort, aber er biegt ihn dabei nach

⁵ Diese Freundschaft begann 1890.

⁶ Edgar Salin, *Um Stefan George*, Godesberg, o. J. [1948], S. 281. Für Salins gesamte Behandlung der Frage vgl. ibid. S. 281-286.

seinem Bilde um; er fällt von ihm ab. Gestützt auf Nietzsche, baut er eine Welt auf, die jener gewiß verneint hätte.

Übrigens ist Georges Urteil über Nietzsche verschieden gefärbt. Im *Stern des Bundes* ist Nietzsche lediglich der Prophet, den eine taube Zeit nicht hat hören wollen, der Prophet, der die Werte wieder scharf getrennt hat und den Begriff der Rangordnung wieder mit neuem Leben füllte. Dagegen zählt ihm George in dem beim Tode Nietzsches geschriebenen Gedicht des *Siebenten Ringes* zwar den Zoll der Bewunderung, zeigt jedoch an ihm zugleich einige der Gefahren des deutschen Wesens auf, die Gesetzlosigkeit, die als Schicksal gewählte innere Unruhe, den Hunger nach Wissen, der das Wachstum des dichterischen Genius hemmt. Dies ist nicht die Ehrung eines Meisters durch seinen Schüler. George beklagt an Nietzsche gerade das, was sein eigenstes Selbst ausmacht.⁸

Nachdem David auf die erwähnte Darstellung Edgar Salins lobend hingewiesen hat, schließt er seine Betrachtung mit den kühlen Worten:

„George hatte Sinn für die gewaltigen Ausmaße der Persönlichkeit Nietzsches, sowie für sein im Unglück gleichnishafte Schicksal. Aber Georges gesamte Lehre, sein gesamtes Wirken zwang ihn, sich von Nietzsche abzuwenden. Wenn er ihn fortsetzt, so doch nur, um ihn zu verneinen. Es wäre irrig, wenn man sagen wollte, George habe Nietzsche vollendet. Georges Weg hätte Nietzsche nicht in Erstaunen gesetzt: Nietzsche kannte diesen Weg und hat ihn im voraus verurteilt.“⁹

Trotz dieser gewichtigen Darstellungen will es scheinen, daß Nietzsches Schriften für George ein tieferes Erlebnis bedeuten, als man es hat wahrhaben wollen. Zwei der Grundpfeiler des geistigen Baus Georges, seine ablehnende Haltung zum Christentum und die von ihm verkündete ‚Vergottung des Leibes‘ sind nietzschisch. Auf mancherlei Anklänge georgischer Verse an Nietzsches Gedanken und Formulierungen ist bereits hingewiesen worden: Daß die beiden Schlußverse des Nietzsche-Gedichtes im *Siebenten Ring* nicht von George stammen, sondern ein Zitat aus Nietzsches „Versuch einer Selbstkritik“ (1886), Abschnitt 3 dieser späten Vorrede zur *Geburt der Tragödie* sind, hat Ernst Morwitz angedeutet¹⁰ und Walther Kranz¹¹ sowie Claude David (S. 219, Anm. 2)

⁷ [Gemeint ist das Gedicht „Einer stand auf der scharf wie blitz und stahl . . .“ *Der Stern des Bundes*, Berlin, 1914, S. 28. Nietzsche wird in dem Gedicht nicht bei Namen genannt.]

⁸ Claude David, *Stefan George. Son oeuvre poétique*, Lyon/Paris, 1952, S. 308.

⁹ David, S. 309. David spielt, wie seine Anm. 2 zeigt, auf Nietzsches *Morgenröte*, Aphor. 542 über den alternden Philosophen an, wo sich die Stelle findet: „Jetzt hält er überhaupt die furchtbare Illusion nicht mehr aus, in der jeder vorwärts- und vorausfliegende Geist lebt; er umstellt sich nunmehr mit Gegenständen der Verehrung, der Gemeinschaft, der Rührung und Liebe, er will es endlich auch einmal so gut haben wie alle Religiösen und in der Gemeinde feiern, was er hochschätzt, ja er wird dazu eine Religion erfinden, um nur die Gemeinde zu haben.“

¹⁰ Ernst Morwitz, *Die Dichtung Stefan Georges*, Berlin, 1934, S. 93.

¹¹ Walther Kranz, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, Leipzig, o. J., [1949], S. 114, Anm.

nachgewiesen. David macht darauf aufmerksam (S. 308, Anm. 1), daß I. M. Aler¹² in einer Zeile des Nietzsche-Gedichtes im *Stern des Bundes* (vgl. oben Anm. 7), „dem rad das niederrollt / zur leere,“ gleichfalls eine Prägung Nietzsches entdeckt hat. Beide Stellen sind bewußte Zitate des Dichters.

Bemerkenswerter noch und aufschlußreicher will es jedoch erscheinen, wenn George sich an Prägungen, Wendungen und Gedanken Nietzsches so versieht, daß sie, höchst wahrscheinlich ihm unbewußt, in den dichterischen Prozeß übergehen. Nur eine gleiche oder ähnliche Seelenlage konnte dies möglich machen.

Nietzsches aristokratische Philosophie fand für die von ihm abschätzig bewertete Menge den Ausdruck ‚die große Zahl,‘ vielleicht eine Lehnübersetzung der auch in den amerikanischen Sprachgebrauch übergegangenen griechischen Wendung ‚hoi polloi‘. Nietzsche ist dem griechischen Ausdruck mit pejorativem Gefühlswert u. a. in Platons *Gorgias* (483 b) begegnet. Bei Nietzsche findet sich diese höchst individuelle Prägung z. B. im *Willen zur Macht*: „Daß man das Glück der großen Zahl überläßt . . . Daß man der großen Zahl nicht durch Worte, sondern durch Handlungen widerspricht . . .“¹³ Oder im *Antichrist*: „Bis er (der Gottesbegriff) ‚die große Zahl‘ und die halbe Erde auf seine Seite bekam.“¹⁴ Die Anfangszeilen des Gedichtes „Irrrende Schar“ in Georges *Sagen und Sänge* lauten:

Sie ziehen hin gefolgt vom schelten,
Vom bösen blick der grossen zahl,¹⁵

wo ganz im Sinne der Anschauung Nietzsches die Erwählten der verachteten Menge entgegengesetzt werden.

Im Aphor. 798 des *Willens zur Macht* (III. Buch) lautet der erste Abschnitt: „A p o l l i n i s c h - d i o n y s i s c h — Es gibt zwei Zustände, in denen die Kunst selbst wie eine Naturgewalt im Menschen auftritt, über ihn verfügend, ob er will oder nicht: einmal als Zwang zur Vision, andererseits als Zwang zum Orgasmus. Beide Zustände sind auch im normalen Leben vorgespielt, nur schwächer: im Traum und im Rausch.“ ‚Traum und Rausch‘ ist also Nietzsches abschwächende Verdeutschung seines berühmten Begriffspaares ‚apollinisch und dionysisch‘. Den Wörtern ‚Traum‘ und ‚Rausch‘ begegnen wir in der Schlußstrophe des letzten Gedichtes in Georges *Teppich des Lebens*:

All dies stürmt reisst und schlägt blitzt und brennt
Eh für uns spät am nacht-firmament
Sich vereint schimmernd still licht-kleinod:
Glanz und ruhm rausch und qual traum und tod.

¹² I. M. Aler, *Im Spiegel der Form*, Amsterdam, 1947, S. 162.

¹³ *Der Wille zur Macht*, IV. Buch, Aphor. 944.

¹⁴ *Der Antichrist*, Aphor. 17.

¹⁵ *Die Bücher der Hirten- und Preisgedichte, der Sagen und Sänge und der Hängenden Gärten*, 3. Aufl., Berlin, 1907, S. 58.

In den „Einleitungen und Merksprüchen“ zur Achten Folge der *Blätter für die Kunst* (1908/09) zitiert George: „Und weil du Dionysos verlassen so verliess dich Apollo . . . (Nietzsche).“

Ein höchst sublimierter Widerhall des Aphor. 1011 des *Willens zur Macht* (IV. Buch) findet sich in dichterischer Verklärung im gleichen Gedichtband Georges.

Nietzsche: Unsere „neue Welt“: wir müssen erkennen, bis zu welchem Grade wir die Schöpfer unsrer Wertgefühle sind, — also Sinn in die Geschichte legen können.

Dieser Glaube an die Wahrheit geht in uns zu seiner letzten Konsequenz — ihr wißt, wie sie lautet —: daß, wenn es überhaupt etwas anzubeten gibt, es der Schein ist, der angebetet werden muß, daß die Lüge — und nicht die Wahrheit göttlich ist!

George: Ich weiss dass euer herz verblutend stürbe
Wenn ich den spruch nicht kennte der es stillt:
Da jedes bild vor dem ihr fleht und fliehet
Durch euch so gross ist und durch euch so gilt . . .
Beweinet nicht zu sehr was ihr ihm liehet.¹⁶

Im *Stern des Bundes* spricht George von dem neuen Adel der Seele, der sich nicht von altem Geschlecht herleitet:

Neuen adel den ihr suchet
Führt nicht her von schild und krone!
.....
Stammlos wachsen im gewühle
Seltne sprossen eignen ranges . . . (S. 79)

Und im „Vorspiel“ des 15 Jahre älteren *Teppich des Lebens* (VIII) wird ausdrücklich das „Geblüt“ hervorgehoben:

Ihr meine schüler, sprossen von geblüt,
Erkennt und kürt das edle unbemüht . . .

Sollte hier ein Widerhall des Aphor. 942 des *Willens zur Macht* (IV. Buch) hörbar sein? „Es gibt nur Geburtsadel, nur Geblütsadel. (Ich rede hier nicht vom Wörtchen ‚von‘ und dem Gothaischen Kalender . . .) . . . Geist allein nämlich adelt nicht; vielmehr bedarf es erst Etwas, das den Geist adelt. — Wessen bedarf es denn dazu? Des Geblüts.“

Für das Gedicht „Der Gehenkte“ in Georges letztem Werk *Das Neue Reich* bietet Ernst Morwitz die unzweifelhaft richtige Deutung: „Er (der Verbrecher) ahnt, daß er, der heut Verworfene, im Wandel der Zeiten und Geister schon morgen dem Volk als Held und Bezwingen erscheinen kann wie die Märtyrer alter und neuer Zeit, und biegt durch

¹⁶ *Der Teppich des Lebens*, Vorspiel XII.

den Zauber des Sichtbar-werdens seines gewaltsamen, vorzeitigen Endes den starren Balken des Galgens zum laufenden Rad des antichristlichen Seins.“ (S. 167 f.)

Der Gehenkte

.....
 Als man den hals mir in die schlinge steckte
 Sah schadenfroh ich den triumf voraus:
 Als sieger dring ich einst in euer hirn
 Ich der verscharrte . . . und in eurem samen
 Wirk ich als held auf den man lieder singt
 Als gott . . . und eh ihrs euch versahet, biege
 Ich diesen starren balken um zum rad.¹⁷

Claude David erkennt den Geist Nietzsches in diesem georgischen Gedicht an, freilich ohne eine bestimmte Nietzsche-Stelle anzuführen: „Kein Gedicht Georges ist in höherem Grade aus dem Geist Nietzsches geboren. Es ist eine Rechtfertigung des Prinzips des Bösen. Der Verbrecher . . . weiß, daß die Zukunft ihm gehört. Das Böse, sofern es nur stark ist, bewegt die Welt. Der Gehenkte wird zum Heros, in einer künftigen Epoche wird er ein Gott sein.“ (S. 346)

Nietzsche spricht vom „Verbrecher und was ihm verwandt ist“ in der *Götzen-Dämmerung* (Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemäßen), Aphor. 45:

– Der Verbrecher-Typus, das ist der Typus des starken Menschen unter ungünstigen Bedingungen . . . Verallgemeinern wir den Fall des Verbrechers: denken wir uns Naturen, denen, aus irgend einem Grunde, die öffentliche Zustimmung fehlt, die wissen, daß sie nicht als wohlthätig, als nützlich empfunden werden . . . sondern als ausgestoßen, unwürdig, verunreinigend . . . Aber fast alle Existenzformen, die wir heute auszeichnen, haben ehemals unter dieser halben Grablufte gelebt: der wissenschaftliche Charakter, der Artist, das Genie, der freie Geist, der Schauspieler, der Kaufmann, der große Entdecker . . . Fast jedes Genie kennt als eine seiner Entwicklungen die ‚catilinäische Existenz‘, ein Haß-, Rache-, und Aufstands-Gefühl gegen Alles, was schon ist, was nicht mehr wird . . . Catilina – Die Präexistenzform jedes Cäsar.

Auch im *Willen zur Macht*, III. Buch, Aphor. 736, tut Nietzsche seine Ansicht über den Verbrecher kund: „ . . . wir widerstreben der Vorstellung, daß alle großen Menschen Verbrecher waren (nur im großen Stil und nicht im erbärmlichen), daß das Verbrechen zur Größe gehört . . . Die ‚Vogelfreiheit‘ von dem Herkommen, dem Gewissen, der Pflicht – jeder große Mensch kennt diese seine Gefahr. Aber er will sie auch: er will das große Ziel und darum auch seine Mittel.“

George hat seine Lehre von der ‚Vergottung des Leibes‘ am deut-

¹⁷ Das Neue Reich, Berlin, o. J., [1928], S. 69.

lichsten im Templer-Gedicht im *Siebenten Ring* im Vers, sowie in der Neunten Folge der *Blätter für die Kunst* in Prosa ausgesprochen:

Und wenn die grosse Nährerin im zorne
Nicht mehr sich mischend neigt am untern borne,
In einer weltnacht starr und müde pocht:
So kann nur einer der sie stets befocht

Und zwang und nie verfuhr nach ihrem rechte
Die hand ihr pressen, packen ihre flechte,
Dass sie ihr werk willfährig wieder treibt:
Den leib vergottet und den gott verleibt.¹⁸

In der genannten Blätterfolge sagt George: „Das Hellenische Wunder — . . . Hinter den erklärungen geschichtlicher, schönheitkundiger und persönlicher art liegt der glaube dass von allen äusserungen der uns bekannten jahrtausende der Griechische Gedanke: ‚der Leib, dies sinnbild der vergänglichkeit, DER LEIB SEI DER GOTT‘ weitaus der schöpferischste und unausdenkbarste, weitaus der größte, kühnste und menschenwürdigste war, dem an erhabenheit jeder andre, sogar der christliche, nachstehn muß.“¹⁹

Das Wort von der ‚Vergöttlichung des Leibes‘ findet sich bei Nietzsche im *Willen zur Macht*, IV. Buch, Aphor. 1051:

Zu den höchsten und erlauchtesten Menschen-Freuden, in denen das Dasein seine eigene Verklärung feiert, kommen, wie billig, nur die Allerseltensten und Bestgearteten: und auch diese nur, nachdem sie selber und ihre Vorfahren ein langes vorbereitendes Leben auf dieses Ziel hin, und nicht einmal im Wissen um dieses Ziel, gelebt haben . . . der Geist ist dann ebenso in den Sinnen heimisch und zu Hause, wie die Sinne in dem Geiste zu Hause und heimisch sind . . . Es ist wahrscheinlich, daß bei solchen vollkommenen und wohlgeratenen Menschen zuletzt die allersinnlichsten Verrichtungen von einem Gleichnis-Rausch der höchsten Geistigkeit verklärt werden; sie empfinden an sich eine Art Vergöttlichung des Leibes und sind am entferntesten von der Asketen-Philosophie des Satzes ‚Gott ist ein Geist‘ . . .

Auch in dem Gedicht „Du trugst in holder scham die stirn gesenkt . . . “ (*Der Stern des Bundes*, Drittes Buch) findet sich eine Parallele zu diesem Aphorismus Nietzsches.

Nach diesen Belegen möchte es scheinen, daß Georges Affinität zu Nietzsche doch enger ist, als es die bisherige Literatur über den Dichter vermuten läßt.

¹⁸ Der Siebente Ring, Berlin, 1907, S. 53.

¹⁹ Blätter für die Kunst, Neunte Folge, o. O., 1910, S. 2.

EXCERPTS FROM AN UNPUBLISHED DIARY OF RENE' SCHICKELE

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In the introduction to the French edition of René Schickele's novel *Die Witwe Bosca* Thomas Mann introduces the author to the French public and then writes: "Nicht die gesicherte, selbstverständliche und fraglose Existenz, — die zusammengesetzte, übergängliche und fragwürdige, des Fragens würdige Natur macht das literarische Genie."¹ Schickele said once: "Meine Herkunft ist mein Schicksal. Ich hätte vielleicht manches der Form nach besser machen können, aber kaum dem Wesen nach."² By birth Schickele was an Alsatian. His home was the borderland where for centuries France and Germany have fought for supremacy. One is tempted to describe Schickele's elegance, his sprightly wit and his sound, keen judgment as his French heritage, and his heartfelt intimacy with nature as well as his acute perception of the demonic aspects of life as the German component of his individuality. These "German" elements in his disposition impart solidity and substance to his "French" intellectual brilliance. The exigency for a synthesis of diverse and at times opposing traits, the need for the ultimate resolution of an apparently unsupportable duality give Schickele's work its characteristic cast.

Schickele counted Gottfried von Strassburg among his literary predecessors.³ From Jean Paul, his favorite, he acquired a predilection for bizarre and grotesque perspectives. Like Heine, Schickele was a realist who used all the devices of romanticism. Most of all he loved sparkling epigrams and striking word effects. He was a master of landscape descriptions. His landscape is, however, never a static image. It is of all characters in his works the most dramatic; it has its various states and its own development. At times the landscape functions as a Greek chorus.

Schickele's political attitude, his pacifism and socialism, was determined largely by his origin. He regarded Alsace as the testing ground for the relations between France and Germany which, he felt, determine the fate of Europe. As an Alsatian author he thought himself especially well qualified to mediate between the cultures of France and Germany. He conceived of a spiritual reconstitution of a European cultural community as it had existed during Charlemagne's reign. Ultimately, however, Schickele's pacifism rested upon a belief in the sanctity of all life. "Es gibt einen unverrückbaren, einen absoluten Punkt in unsrem Lebensplan, wenn ich so sagen darf, die Weigerung zu töten."⁴ He regarded socialism as a movement of great idealism advocating the abolition of private prop-

¹ Thomas Mann, *Altes und Neues* (Kleine Prosa aus fünfzig Jahren), Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1953. 560.

² René Schickele, *Biographische Notiz*. Unpublished manuscript.

³ René Schickele, "My debts to books," *Books Abroad*, 3, X (Summer, 1936), 277.

erty for the purpose of allowing man to find himself at last. Communism represented a complete negation of his ideals because it is based on violence. "Ich will," he wrote,⁵ "daß der Komplex der Gewalt aus der Welt verschwindet. Wir alle wollen die Welt ändern, wir alle wollen Gerechtigkeit, wir alle wollen das Reich des Glücks, in dem die Menschen einander das Leben leicht machen, aber ich stehe dafür, daß Gewalt keine Änderung schafft, nur Wechsel, — Wechsel des Besitzes, Wechsel der Macht." The antagonist of love is for Schickele not hate but brute violence. This is a belief which he maintained throughout his life and which finds frequent expression in his work.

The trilogy *Das Erbe am Rhein* (*Maria Capponi* [1925]; *Blick auf die Vogesen* [1927]; *Der Wolf in der Hürde* [1931]) is best known among Schickele's works. The principal problem is the intellectual existence of the Alsatian. Schickele is sensitively attuned to the landscape and to his characters. His humanistic tolerance and yielding to life's all-pervasive beauty scintillates in the thousand fibres of the narrative. In the family drama *Hans im Schnakenloch* (1916) which is set in Alsace during the first World War, Schickele pleads for Franco German understanding. Pacifistic convictions are expressed particularly in the two essay collections, *Die Genfer Reise* (1919) and *Wir wollen nicht sterben!* (1922), and in the magazine *Die weißen Blätter*, which he edited during the first World War.

Because of his humanistic disposition, his pacifism, and his socialistic ideas Schickele was closely associated with the expressionists, whose program of political action embraced these ideals. However, the manifestations of expressionism in his works are balanced by other mellower qualities, — an aversion to extremes in style and form, a native fondness for elegance and grace, a dislike of drastic formulations. His last two novels, *Die Witwe Bosca* (1932) and *Die Flaschenpost* (1937), are examples of Schickele's mature style, which Thomas Mann described as "die anmutigste Prosa von heute. Creme, Blüte, Spitze, das Äußerste an heiterer und gesunder Verfeinerung."⁶

In the fall of 1932 Schickele left Germany with his family to spend the winter at the French Riviera. When Hitler came to power in 1933, Schickele decided not to return to Germany and resigned from the Prussian Academy. The advent of national socialism seemed to him the advent of total insanity. He was convinced that Hitler would remain in power for at least ten years and that national socialism would finally end in war. He settled in the South of France, first at Sanary-sur-mer near Toulon, then at Nice-Fabron, and finally at Vence in the mountains of the Provence, where he died in 1940.

Sanary-sur-mer harbored in 1933 an extraordinarily large number of

⁴ René Schickele, *Die Genfer Reise*, Berlin: Cassierer, 1919. 174.

⁵ René Schickele, *Wir wollen nicht sterben!*, München: Kurt Wolff, 1922. 70.

⁶ Quoted in the diary, December 16, 1933.

literary refugees from Germany, including Thomas Mann, Heinrich Mann, Klaus Mann, Bert Brecht, Josef Breitbach, Lion Feuchtwanger, Bruno Frank, Wilhelm Herzog, Hermann Kesten, Ludwig Marcuse, Ernst Toller, Friedrich Wolff, Arnold Zweig, and Stefan Zweig. Franz Werfel and Fritz von Unruh lived in neighboring towns. The literary colony was a gregarious and gossipy world. The exiles found many opportunities to discuss political events, to speculate about the duration of Hitler's regime, and to argue about the technical problems of the novelist's craft.

Schickele's unpublished papers include a diary⁷ which he kept at Sanary and at Nice-Fabron between October, 1933, and August, 1934. The philosophical observations in the diary and his private comments on events and people reflect a short interval in Schickele's life and throw light on some of the problems of literary exile during the first months of Hitler's regime.

The diary records his continued pre-occupation with Germany and his anxiety lest he should become separated from his German readers. As a pacifist he could not approve of the literary warfare which was conducted by other exiles at Paris and other centers against Hitler's Germany. Instead he trusted in the persuasive and conciliatory efficacy of the serene work of art. "Ein gutes Gedicht, ein schönes Stück Prosa, — müssen sie nicht in der Gewöhnlichkeit der Umgebung nach den Früchten des Paradieses duften?"⁸ In an unpublished letter to Josef Roth he expressed his regret at the state of mind of his aggressive friends at Paris: "Merkwürdig, wie leicht die Opfer die Geistesverfassung des Henkers annehmen. Wer Rache nimmt, ist nicht nur böse, er ist dumm."⁹

The political situation seemed to Schickele secondary in importance to man's religious difficulty. Man, he thought, is suffering from a disease whose name is "life without God." In his French book, *Le Retour* (1938), he says: "[Lamnladie] n'est qu'à ses débuts; car tous, nous avons encore le souvenir de Dieu. Elle deviendra terrible, une fois ce souvenir effacé."¹⁰

The following excerpts from a manuscript comprising about 150 pages have been selected for their general interest.

December 11, 1933.

Melde mich in Badenweiler polizeilich ab. Eine Tür geht zu. Deutschland? Was ist Deutschland? Wer ist Deutschland? Sehr gut, dass Kunst

⁷ The manuscript is in the possession of Anna Schickele at Badenweiler. The following excerpts are here published with her kind permission.

⁸ René Schickele, "August," *Mass und Wert*, I. 1, 139.

⁹ Letter from Schickele to Josef Roth, dated January 28, 1934. Seven type-written pages. The original letter passed after Josef Roth's death into the possession of Herman Kesten, with whose permission it is here quoted.

¹⁰ René Schickele, *Le Retour*, Les oeuvres libres, nr. 202, Paris: Fayard, April 1938, 85.

und Philosophie für einige Zeit vom Markt wegkommen. Sie schielten schon viel zu stark nach dem Publikum. Ist das mehr als ein kümmerlicher Trost für uns, die wir drauf und dran sind, Deutschland zu verlieren. Hesse und ich und auch J.¹¹, wir würden eine körperliche Trennung (es ist mehr als nur eine körperliche) von Deutschland recht gut vertragen – wenn wir nur weiterhin in Deutschland publizieren könnten.

* * * *

Wir alle, wie wir hier sind, hänger letzthin von unsrer Gemeinschaft mit Deutschland ab, und bestände diese auch nur in Widerspruch.

* * * *

Wir sind keine Ärzte, die überall heilen, keine Kaufleute, die überall handeln, keine Leute, die hier und dort unterschlüpfen können. Wenn es Goebbels gelingt, unsre Namen von den deutschen Tafeln zu löschen, sind wir tot. Gespenster in der Diaspora, in der wasserarmen Provinz. Schon die nächste Generation wird nichts mehr von uns wissen. Heine? Er hatte seinen deutschen Verleger und neben böartigen auch freundlich gesinnte Zensoren. Er hatte seine Augsburger Zeitung. Victor Hugo? Nie so berühmt und geliebt, wie während seiner Verbannung. Die restlose Vernichtung des Gedankens, diese unsichtbare Guillotine, hat erst die moderne Diktatur ersonnen. Fragt sich, ob sie lange genug funktioniert, Eine Zeitfrage.

* * * *

December 16, 1933.

Nicht richtig was Edgar Allen Poe und in seinem Gefolge Baudelaire und Mallarmé meinten: dass der Beifall der Mehrheit, der Masse, genüge, um die Schlechtigkeit einer Sache zu beweisen. In diesem Fall hätte die Menge Charakter. Es steht viel schlimmer um sie. Man kann sie dazu bringen, alles zu bewundern, sogar das Gute.

* * * *

Bei einem Künstler, der den Namen verdient, ist die "Kunst für ihn allein" immer auch die Kunst für Gott.

* * * *

March 30, 1934

"Charfreitagszauber." Ein Frühlingstag in Freiburg, "Zähringer Hof." Das Zimmer hatte einen kleinen Balkon, von dem blickte ich über die Dächer des Bahnhofsviertels. Die Dächer lagen im Sonnendunst, darin sprudelte bläulicher Rauch aus den Schornsteinen, leise, beständig, wie Quellen. Die Bäume standen kahl und grau, kein Flecken Grün, und doch dampfte die Stadt von Gewissheit des Frühlings. Die schimmernden Dächer, die helle Strasse, die hellen Stimmen von unten. Das Geräusch der rangierenden Züge erinnerte an ein Orchester, das die Instrumente stimmt, und der Stoss, den es jedesmal gab, wenn ein Fernzug einfuhr,

¹¹ Julius Meier-Graefe, art historian and Schickele's closest friend during this period.

klang wie ein Schlag, der die Erde von einer Quelle entband. Dieser Tag fällt mir immer wieder ein, obwohl ich sonst *nichts* von ihm weiss. Ich habe ihn schon in der *Maria Capponi* (Kapitel Gletscherspalte) benutzt und ihm einen Inhalt gegeben, von dem ich nur weiss, dass er jenem Tag fernlag. Ich könnte ihm noch manch andern "Inhalt" geben. Er ist eine Form, in die viel hineingeht. Zustand dichterischer Empfangnisbereitschaft.

• • • •

April 4, 1934

Woher der Hass gegen diesen kreuzbraven, etwas eitlen, völlig harmlosen Menschen.¹² Ich versuche mitzufühlen, was in jener Nacht in ihm vorging, da sie ihn ergriffen. Ich bin trunken von Trauer. Schwarzes Blut. Hass, befreiend. Glorie der Gewalttat. Rache, grösste aller Wollüste. Ich werde sein Bild nicht los — mit dem Hals in der Schlings, den langen Beinen. Die arme Frau. Sein herzkranker Sohn, der es in der Zeitung liest. Man kann sich das Ereignis nicht aussuchen, durch das eine Sache zum brennenden Erlebnis wird.

• • • •

April 18, 1934

Es klingt seltsam, und doch darf ich es sagen: ich fühlte es, als ich den *Hans im Schnakenloch* schrieb. In der ersten Zeit meines Schweizer Aufenthalts wollte ich, wie Hans Boulanger, die Konsequenzen ziehn. Da sah ich, dass die Gegner Deutschlands durch die "Macht der Tatsachen," nämlich den Krieg und seine bis in die Tiefe der Einzelseele reichenden, den Menschen verwüstenden Begleiterscheinungen ihm aufs Haar glichen, und wurde Pazifist, d. h. ich leugnete die Möglichkeit, die Misstände unsrer Zivilisation durch Kriege zu beheben.

• • • •

May 8, 1934

Ob man je von uns sagen wird, wir seien in dieser Zeit das "eigentliche" Deutschland gewesen? Es gibt ein sehr unerfreuliches "eigentliches" oder "ewiges" Deutschland, das sich von der Völkerwanderung an verfolgen lässt. Freilich, es gibt auch das andere, nur kam es niemals aus den Katakomben heraus, geschweige denn zur Herrschaft. Der Versuch des deutschen Idealismus, mit dem König auf der Menschen Höhen zu gehn, scheiterte, und zwar nicht erst im Waffenlärm der Befreiungskriege. Den überlebenden Rest drückte Bismarck an die Wand, bis er platt war wie ein preussisches Amtssiegel. Trotzdem lebt er immer noch, wie es mir erst gestern der Besuch der Badenweilener Schulmeisterstochter vor Augen führte — gerade bei den sogenannten kleinen Leuten, was merk-

¹² This passage refers to Ludwig Marum, a Jewish member of the Reichstag, had been one of the first members of the Reichstag to be imprisoned in a concentration camp. He was reported to have hanged himself on April 1, 1934, at the concentration camp Kislau. Later evidence indicates that he had been poisoned.

würdig genug ist, wenn man bedenkt, dass dieselben kleinen Leute in ihrer Mehrheit als das erste und grösste Aufgebot von Hitlers Truppen zu gelten haben. Angenommen, das eigentliche Deutschland überlebt die Sintflut, woran ich nicht zweifle, so will ich zufrieden sein, wenn man von mir sagt, ich hätte in Wind und Wetter nicht an ihm verzweifelt.

* * * *

Es ist gut, dass er¹³ fährt, nicht nur für die englischen Jacobsgeschichten. Die Emigration braucht einen Furtwängler, einen lebenswürdigen Zauberer und Freudebringer. Man mag ihn als Botschafter des heimlichen Deutschland ansehen, das schweigt, aber nicht nur bleibt, was es war, sondern notgedrungen in unverletzliche Bezirke seines Daseins zurückfindet.

* * * *

Thomas Mann schreibt mir über den "jungen Joseph": Man hat mir gesagt, die Konzeption sei zwar grossartig, aber allzu geistig; es fehle das sinnliche Gegengewicht. Aber ist es nicht irgendwie doch vorhanden, im Ausdruck, in der Art, die Dinge auszusprechen, im Atmosphärischen, auch in den Menschen, die, glaube ich, dreidimensional sind trotz ihrer typischen Gebundenheit. Ich muss es hoffen, dass mir der dritte Band gelingt, denn ich bin ehrgeizig für uns draussen. Sie und ich und mein Bruder, von dessen "Heinrich dem Vierten" ich viel erwarte, müssen unsre Sache sehr gut machen, damit man einmal sagt, wir seien in dieser Zeit das eigentliche Deutschland gewesen.

* * * *

Das schlimmste ist die Abstumpfung, die Gewöhnung, man darf auch sagen: Anpassung. Darin geht es mir wie aller Welt — und sogar den Insassen der Konzentrationslager. Mit der Zeit, scheint es, bekommt der Mensch sogar Vertrauen zu seinen Henkern. Seltsame Wege des Selbsterhaltungstriebes. Darüber weiss Thomas Mann im "Jungen Joseph" Ausgezeichnetes zu sagen, als er die drei Tage und Nächte schildert, die Joseph im Brunnen verbringt. (Nebenbei: ein Meisterstück ironischer Darstellung.)

* * * *

In jedem Volk gibt es ausserdem Einzelwesen genug, die als lebendige Widerlegung der Völkerpsychologie und ihrer Verallgemeinerungen gelten können. Sie erleiden die Mängel, statt sie zu beschwätzen. Sie sind nicht wenigen "ewig" wie die machtpolitisch wirkenden Kräfte. Wir nennen sie aus Höflichkeit, aus Furcht, aus Sehnsucht, vielleicht auch nur um unser Selbstvertrauen zu stärken, das "eigentliche" Deutschland. Es wäre falsch und gefährlich, praktisch mit ihnen zu rechnen, zumal zu Krisenzeiten. Es wäre leichtfertig, diese geistige Provinz zu übersehen. Sie besteht aus den *Gerechten*, man soll an sie denken wie an das eigene

¹³ Refers to Thomas Mann who was about to sail for the United States in connection with the publication of the American edition of *Joseph in Aegypten*.

Gewissen. Gott hätte sich mit deren fünf begnügt um Sodom und Gomorrha zu verschonen.

* * * *

May 24, 1934.

Meine Gemeinschaft mit den deutschen Oppositionellen beruhte auf einem Irrtum. Sie wünschten ausnahmslos ein starkes Reich, die Sozialdemokraten so gut wie die Kommunisten. Ich wünte ein ästhetisches Deutschland.

* * * *

. . . die Frauen, diese Schlüsselbewahrerinnen oder Pförtnerinnen der Landschaft . . .

* * * *

Wir Armen erreichen nur noch Komfort. Eine Welt ohne Götter ist eine Welt voller Götzen, Nirgends wird unsere Armut deutlicher als an den Stätten des Luxus.

* * * *

Begreiflich, dass der Künstler vor dem gottlosen Wirrwarr der Zeit in den elfenbeinernen Turm flüchtet. Gehn ihn die Händel der wetteifernden Räuberbanden soviel an? Und selbst wenn, — was kann er schon gegen sie ausrichten! Er ist der erste, dessen Zuständigkeit bestritten wird. Der einfachste Stolz sollte ihm gebieten sich fern zu halten. Er gehört zu keiner sozialen Kategorie. Er ist von Natur das Eigenbröderischste, was es gibt. Einen halben Schritt weiter beginnt die Narrheit.

* * * *

July 25, 1934.

Je älter wir werden, umso rascher altern die Dinge um uns. Als ob wir keine Zeit mehr hätten, lange bei ihnen zu verweilen.

* * * *

August 6, 1934.

Abends am Hafen von Sanary. Die letzten Verwandlungen des Lichts auf dem "Heiligen Land." Die Welt der *Witwe Bosca* — so fern schon, ein früheres Leben. Auf der Terrasse: Bruno Frank, Feuchtwanger mit ihren Frauen, Klo,¹⁴ Stieler, Marcuse und Frau, Sybille von Schönbeck, Eva Hermann. Auch diese Menschen scheinen mir zu einem früheren Leben zu gehören. J.¹⁵ ragt daraus hervor wie ein bemooster Fels. Er allein ist mir nahe.

* * * *

Jeder baut um seine Not eine Festung. Fragt sich, was die Not des Einzelnen für die Allgemeinheit bedeutet.

¹⁴ Eric Klossowsky, a painter and an intimate friend of Schickele.

¹⁵ Julius Meier-Graefe.

A NOTE ON "HERBERT ENGELMANN"

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The appearance in print in 1952 of the Hauptmann-Zuckmayer, drama, *Herbert Engelmann*, has elicited two essays devoted to it. The first, by C. F. W. Behl, ("Zuckmayers Hauptmann-Drama," *Deutsche Rundschau*, LXXVIII (June, 1952), 609-611) is concerned primarily with the genesis and development of the Hauptmann version, and the second, by Helmut Boeninger, ("A Play and Two Authors," *Monatshefte*, XLIV (November, 1952), 341-348) deals with the changes which Zuckmayer has effected in the original version.¹ But in neither of these articles has even a relatively complete delineation of the complex psychological motivations of the hero appeared, nor has Boeninger included all the important changes of the Zuckmayer version. This paper is dedicated to filling these gaps.

The first change which Boeninger does not take into account is a question of dramatic technique. It might be classified under the general heading of "dramatic economy", and it appears in four tangible aspects throughout the drama. The basic problem in this work is that of a *Heimkehrer*, returning from World War I, who, in an unstable mental and nervous state, commits murder, and who then attempts to escape from his own persuant conscience and from the arms of justice. The latter attempt is conditionally successful, for he is released, though not acquitted, for lack of evidence, but the former attempt fails in spite of the salient event of the drama — his "Flucht in die Liebe" — and he commits suicide.

The drama is of analytic construction, that is, the reader or viewer experience in retrospect the tension latent in situations which progressively reveal the guilt of the hero, so that we are finally prepared for his arrest and consequent suicide. We also become aware of the significance of his attempt to salvage his own personality and to justify his existence by the marriage to his rescuing angel. Hence, that the reader be made aware of this essential background of guilt is of prime importance, and yet this feature is in rudimentary form in the Hauptmann version. When the reader is suddenly confronted with Herbert Engelmann's arrest, he is not, in the face of Herbert's protestations of innocence, thoroughly convinced that this self-pitying, complaining, rather insipid young man is actually capable of any decisive action, let alone a cold-blooded murder.

Hence, the first aspect Zuckmayer's dramatic economy is in the expository revelation of Herbert's guilt, and the method by which this is accomplished justifies the term "economy". Zuckmayer builds up sus-

¹ Boeninger seems to have been unaware of the Behl essay, and consequently fails to present in proper perspective Herbert's varying professional interests. Cf. Boeninger, p. 345 to Behl, p. 609.

picion of Herbert, implants in the audience a sense that somehow all is not well, and effects this feeling by directing apparently innocuous remarks toward this end. Let concrete examples illustrate.

Two police spies, Kohlrausch and Riedel, are present in Herbert's boarding house with the specific assignment to apprehend the murderer. This is revealed at the end of Act I. Zuckmayer from the first arouses our curiosity toward Kohlrausch by the following remarks not present in the Hauptmann version: The spy gives as his reason for selecting this *Pension*: "Ich habe in diesem Stadtteil beruflich zu tun." (p. 130), even though he has just stated that he has no occupation at present. In reply to his landlady's doubt: "Ich dachte, Sie sehen sich erst mal um.", he responds: "Jawohl. Grade in dieser Gegend." (p. 130) When a fringe character inquires about Kohlrausch and is told: "Er sieht sich um, sagt er.", the reply is: "Das kommt mir auch so vor. Er sieht sich ein bißchen viel um, will mir scheinen." (p. 137) And again we hear: "Gott weiß, was er wirklich ist." (p. 137), or "... von diesem angeblichen Major." (p. 137) etc.

Suspicion of the other police spy, Riedel, is also heightened by Zuckmayer. In almost every encounter with Herbert, Riedel makes pointed ambiguous remarks about him and his actions. At one point he attempts to force a confession from him. Herbert construes his remarks as a "Herausforderung", and the conversation enters on thin ice with the words: "Riedel: ... Glauben Sie nicht, daß mir für das, was Sie sagen, jedes Verständnis abgeht. Ich halte es sogar für eine allgemeine Pflicht, Menschen wie Ihnen mildernde Umstände zuzubilligen. Herbert: Mildernde Umstände! Wofür? Riedel: Ich meine: auf jeden Fall ..." (p. 194) Such pointed references can scarcely be misconstrued. And all this is new in the Zuckmayer version.

Again the very background is pointed toward Herbert, even to such finesses as having him enter just after the remark is made: "Es laufen schon viel zu viele Verbrechernaturen in der Welt herum." (p. 158)

Herbert's own remarks and actions are perhaps the most decisive example of Zuckmayer's expository improvement, but since the second part of this paper is devoted to this, no example will be given here.

The second aspect of Zuckmayer's dramatic economy is in the characters of the play. Their dialogue and actions are far more in keeping with their personalities and in turn are often directed toward the furtherance of the plot, rather than toward forming simply background atmosphere. The most prominent example is that of Riedel. In Zuckmayer he is painted as the shrewd observer. (He, rather than a minor character, is interested in Herbert's abject fear of letter carriers.) He is sensitive. He too, like Herbert, has dreams of the war, yet he has gained from it "eine erhebende Erinnerung". (p. 161) He understands Herbert and despises him, hence, he is a dramatic counterpart to Christa, Herbert's fiancée, then wife, who, because she understands Herbert, loves him.

And Christa feels the natural abhorrence of the spy. During the trial he follows his goal of conviction with feverish hatred ("wie ein Hetzhund" p. 266), yet Herbert says of him: "In sein Gesicht kommt mitunter ein Ausdruck von Treuherzigkeit, von Verständnis, ja, fast von Menschlichkeit. Aber grade daraus, aus diesem Menschlich-Verstehenden, haucht mich ein unerklärliches Grauen an." (pp. 194-195)

Christa, too, is more consistently drawn in the Zuckmayer version. Hauptmann insinuates that she is perhaps a bit morally loose in that she has offered encouragement to the sensualist Baron's suit, but Zuckmayer omits this entire by-play, as well as the attempted seduction of Christa. And we see considerably more of her feelings toward Herbert.

And again, Herbert's own character shows the greatest consolidation and consistency.

The third aspect of economy is in the construction of the play itself. The Hauptmann version often leaves us unprepared for subsequent events in the play, whereas Zuckmayer lays an easy groundwork. Christa's mother's design for marrying her daughter off to a man considerably older appears completely out of keeping in Hauptmann, but such lines as: "Mit Weißflock ist es was anderes. Mir scheint, er wird immer jünger, je mehr Erfolg er im Leben hat. Für ihn käme viel eher ein Mädchen deines Alters in Betracht." (p. 146), or, "Selbst Onkel Weißflock scheint mir daran (marriage with Christa) zu denken." (p. 185) prepare us for this notion. Christa's plan for saving Herbert from himself by marrying him is elucidated by her saying: "Dabei gibt es doch Tausende, die auch an den Kriegsfolgen leiden, und sich allmählich wieder erholen, — vielleicht grade durch eine Ehe, durch ein richtiges Leben . . ." (p. 148). And Herbert supports her plans: "An dir könnte ein Armer Heinrich gesunden, und der Drache würde seinen Kopf in deinen Schoß legen." (p. 185) Herbert's sudden appearance in Act III as a successful dramatist is prepared by his mentioning his stage connections, and the implied idea of his writing a play permits Zuckmayer to advance this development logically. None of the above details are present in Hauptmann.

The fourth aspect of economy is a small but illustrative note. The whole *Tempel-Orden* ceremony, which seems so out of place in Hauptmann, in addition to providing comic effect as Boeninger points out, finds a significant place in the plot when we see Herbert's interest in the order intensified and more pointedly grounded in the added emphasis placed on this organization's putative ability to secure acquittal of convicted criminals.

These four aspects of Zuckmayer's dramatic technique provide us with a series of changes in the Hauptmann version which are of considerable interest. But perhaps the most interesting alteration made occurs in the personality of the hero, Herbert Engelmann.

Even as a young boy Herbert had exhibited the unhealthy germs of his mental precariousness, which were magnified by war into a com-

plete mental and moral breakdown. We find that while at school Herbert was precocious and brilliant, but even then original and rash to the point of eccentricity. "Er lernte spielend, fast ohne zu arbeiten durchflog er das Gymnasium, aber man mußte ihn zweimal umschulen, einmal wäre er beinah raus geflogen, — warum? Origineller Kopf, genialer Funke, Oppositionsgeist." (p. 257)

This desire to oppose, to rebel, to protest is brought to an extreme by the war and its attendant horrors. Especially when his idealism is dashed to the ground and he returns home from the prison camp to find that soldiers are not welcomed as returning heroes, and Germany is in a state of moral as well as economic collapse. In the war he has learned a disregard for life, his own life as well as that of others and his disillusionment is so great that he may kill without feeling great moral compunction in order that he himself may exist. It is in a state of moral deterioration that this brilliant but delicately balanced young man returns. Then the disillusionment and despair, swelling into desperation at that which he finds on his return home, burst out in an eruption which puts into deadly practice what he had learned in the war. We see an example of his rage (absent in the Hauptmann version) when Herbert, in the grip of his emotions, passionately brandishes a bread knife in the heat of an argument. His extreme irritability and resentment toward those who were his superiors in the army is evident on more than one occasion.

In the Zuckmayer version he is less hysterical and complaining than in the Hauptmann version, his wrath is more positive and, as Zuckmayer puts it, he struggles more with himself than he complains of his lot. In the latter version Herbert assumes full responsibility for the murder. Christa protests, when they discuss the slaying before it is known that Herbert is implicated in it: "Dann war es doch gar kein Mord. Dann wollte er ihn gar nicht töten!" but Herbert maintains: "Du meinst, weil es mehr aus Zufall geschehen ist? Das entschuldigt den Täter nicht. Der Mord ist geschehen. Der Mord war in seiner Seele." (p. 237) whereas, in the corresponding scene of the Hauptmann version, Herbert claims: "Das sieht ja ein Blinder, es war kein Mord!" (p. 86)

The psychology of Herbert after the deed is committed is interesting. After his crime, he assumes his guilt fully, but determines to preserve his own life. He lives with the consciousness of the deed on his heart, but is driven on by the desire to live. He is obsessed with the feeling that the affair must come to a head sometime, somehow. He does not accept passively that which he has done, only to go about in the hope that he will not be found out. Rather he is certain that he will be caught, but he is determined to preserve himself. Hence, he lives in constant suspense and in expectation of the coming trial. This, rather than the pangs of conscience, is at the bottom of his irritability and his erratic actions. This is what drives him to almost hysterical extremes, this activates his fear of letter carriers, his suspicion of everyone, his distrust

of the army majors, and when it increases to the point of driving him from the street in abject, unreasoning terror, because he has seen a letter carrier, it has reached a high point. Only Christa can save him from his own horrible suspense.

If he accepted the deed without qualms as his vindictive philosophy demands, his actions would have been conditioned by fear, but would have lacked the defiant challenging attitude which he assumes toward everyone. He *knows* his life is unjustified, that his moral behavior has been wrong, but he cannot *admit* this even to himself. Hence he is living on a false basis, but on one which he cannot admit is fake. Only Christa might save him from his dilemma; thus he attempts his "Flucht in die Liebe".

The Hauptmann remarks about his fearing a court trial are significantly omitted in Zuckmayer, since it is actually the trial he is living for. All has been building up in his mind toward this one objective. And he has planned for it. He has plotted his course toward his goal with great care and cunning.

The key to this, and an extremely important one it is, is evident in Zuckmayer and not in Hauptmann. This change which Zuckmayer has made, although it has escaped notice until now, is perhaps the most important in the whole drama. During the court trial (in both Hauptmann and Zuckmayer), it is brought out that after the murder was committed, Herbert had deposited a large amount of money in the bank, the spoils from the robbery. However, Herbert's story is that he had found this money in an old coat of his father. He succeeds in convincing the court of this, although in the Hauptmann version, it seems to be an extremely weak excuse, constructed on the spur of the moment. It is a manifest lie, and Herbert as much as admits it to his council in the last act. The significant change is this: In the Zuckmayer version we hear of this amount of money and Herbert's story of how he acquired it, in Act II, before his marriage to Christa, before he is caught and *before there is any question of a trial*. In other words, Herbert has planned his story carefully, he has laid the groundwork for his testimony in court, literally months before he is caught! It is this element which gives to Herbert the aspect of a cunning, clever criminal, who is prepared, even to the most minute details, for the defense of his life. And indeed it is this frightful anticipation that leads to his downfall, for he has been preparing in his mind for the showdown, the trial. This uncertainty, this impatience to bring his plan into action becomes so painful that his life is a living hell of anticipation. When he is finally taken prisoner, his greatest emotion is that of relief. He remarks: "Laß, laß — mir ist zum erstenmal wohl. Zum erstenmal seit langer Zeit." (p. 246) It is like an actor preparing to appear on the stage and suffering untold nervousness and fear, until he actually makes his entrance; then, his fear turns

to relief, and he is able to produce that which he has so carefully rehearsed.

During the period of suspense, his neurotic sensitivity is increased to the point that he can sense the presence of danger. "... auf hundert Schritt Abstand erkenne ich einen Geheimpolizisten." (p. 211) he asserts, and he recognizes the two police spies in the *Pension* without delay. It is interesting to note that he does not protest his innocence in the Zuckmayer version when he is taken prisoner. Indeed, Herbert is so overcome with the emotion of relief, that the thought of his planned course of action, his appeal of innocence, has been for the moment forgotten.

After the trial is over, and Herbert has been released "wegen Mangels an Beweisen" instead of "not guilty" as he had planned, or "guilty" as he must have hoped, Herbert suffers a terrific letdown. During the period before the trial, he had been living in anticipation of his proving time, and during the trial he has been occupied by his own defense. But now that he is free, he no longer has the incentive, the immediate goal of his life before him. He is now trapped by having been released by the court, yet having within himself the consciousness of his guilt which has not found an outlet.

"Wenn ich auch heute auf freiem Fuße bin, — so bin ich doch noch immer ein Gefangener." (p. 265) he asserts to Christa, and when urged to throw himself again into the student life which he had left, he cannot, for "Es sitzt mir wie ein Bleiklumpen in der Brust." (p. 163) He is trapped by having been robbed of the means to continue living, namely, the urge to indulge his will to live by plans for the coming fight, and no substitute can take the place of this motivation. As long as his life is endangered, the will to preserve it perseveres, but when there is no longer danger present, a void is left which robs him of resistance. The "Bleiklumpen" of his unadmitted guilt rests heavily upon him: "Wissen Sie, was das Schlimmste ist?" he asks, then avers: "Daß man ihn nicht auflösen, nicht auftauen, sich nicht ausschütten, nicht einmal voll und ganz das Herz entladen kann." (p. 263)

He sees there is no way out. In a grand catharsis, he unburdens his heart to Christa and confesses his guilt. Suicide is his own answer. But the motivation for his suicide is also connected with his change of philosophy. Returning from the war, he believed that life has little value and little sense. "... die Verzweiflung an Sinn und Wert des Menschenlebens, mit dem gleichzeitigen instinkthaften Antrieb, das eigene zu erhalten und es zu einer neuen, sinnvolleren Kraftquelle zu machen" as Zuckmayer puts it (*Nachwort*, p. 275) permitted the deed, but as Herbert becomes aware of his guilt, he changes. At first he justifies his action to himself: "Sonst aber ist das Leben des Einzelnen, des grauen Flecks in der grauen Masse, nicht mehr wert als das einer Mücke oder eines Wurms. Warum ließen sich die Menschen auch sonst wie die Viehherden zur Schlachtbank treiben? ... Der Respekt vorm Tod ging dabei in

die Binsen. Wenn man einige Dutzend Sturmangriffe und Nahkämpfe hinter sich hat, kommt's einem nicht mehr darauf an, ob man einen Floh knickt, oder einem Menschen mit eigenen Händen den Garaus macht." (new in Zuckmayer, p. 193)

Later, however, he changes his attitude. His attempts at self-justification are less well founded and are only maintained by the suspense of the anticipated showdown. He rationalizes his feeling of guilt to the point: "Das ist die Schuld, die jeder an allem trägt, was auf der Welt Böses geschieht." (p. 218) But after the trial is over, his true feelings return to him and he is no longer the overwrought, tense bundle of nerves. Then, with the reason for his false, rationalized philosophy removed, his true feelings, suppressed for so long, come rushing back to him, and he realizes his guilt consciously. This realization forces him to the conclusion that even though he is freed by the court, he must suffer the consequences of his deed: "Ich hatte das Leben hassen, den Tod verachten gelernt. Was war mir ein Mensch – einer unter Millionen? Ja, ich dachte, was ich vernichte, was ich mir nehme, könne ich tausendfältig zurückerstatten. Das war mein Wahn. Jetzt aber weiß ich: jedesmal, wenn ein Mensch stirbt, stirbt Gott. Denn das Leben ist heilig, Christa. Nur das Leben ist heilig. Jedes einzelne Leben auf der Welt. *Wer das verletzt, ist gerichtet.*" (new in Zuckmayer, p. 271, italics mine) This is the motive for his suicide. His moral fiber has been restored, the period of suspense is over and with its end his true nature returns. The confession to Christa acts as a complete release, so that he is now his own judge. His plan has been conditionally successful, but having triumphed, he has sealed his own death warrant. He pronounces his sentence and dies.

So it may be seen that Zuckmayer's alterations have produced essentially a new character in the person of Herbert Engelmann, and it is imperative that we recognize and give credit to the author for this succinct and intricately drawn psychological study.



NEWS AND NOTES

IN MEMORIAM ARNO SCHIROKAUER

(1899-1954)

Like many of his generation Arno Schirokauer became an exile from Germany during the Hitler regime. Even for a young man the life of an exile is difficult, and Schirokauer was in his middle years when he left Germany in 1939. He was undaunted by the trials of his new existence, however, and sought unceasingly to make the traditions of his new homeland his own. From difficult beginnings he rose finally to a position of prominence and distinction and had barely reached the peak of his brilliant career when death suddenly came to him on May 24th of this year.

Schirokauer was born on July 20, 1899 in Cottbus in Brandenburg. He received his higher education at the universities of Berlin, Halle, and Munich and worked at all of these institutions with the greatest scholars of his day. During the first World War Schirokauer saw active service with the German Air Force. He was wounded and suffered the loss of one eye. After the war he completed his studies and received the degree of doctor of philosophy *summa cum laude* from the University of Munich in 1921. Although his special field at the university had been Germanic philology with special emphasis on dialectology, Schirokauer always had a lively interest in contemporary German literature. In his post-university years, during which he worked first as librarian in the *Deutsche Bücherei* and later as Director of Cultural Relations of the German Broadcasting Company in Leipzig, he was very close to the Expressionistic movement, and several of his published essays of that period deal with contemporary literary figures. Many students at the Hopkins remember the stimulating lectures on Thomas Mann and Robert Musil which Schirokauer delivered before the writing seminars, and even his last published work was an essay on a contemporary poet whom he had always particularly admired, Ernst Stadler.

Schirokauer began his teaching career in the United States at Southwestern College in Tennessee. In 1941 Yale University awarded him a visiting fellowship, and in 1943 Kenyon College appointed him Coordinator of Area and Language Studies in its Army Specialized Training Program. In 1945 The Johns Hopkins University called him as visiting lecturer. The following year he joined the faculty as professor of Germanic philology. One of the greatest honors bestowed on Schirokauer during the last years was the offer of the chair in Germanic philology at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität in Frankfurt in 1953.

In addition to his busy life as scholar and teacher at the Hopkins Schirokauer was also active in the Goethe Society of Maryland, of which he was president in 1954, and in the Society for the History of the

Germans in Maryland, whose members elected him Vice-President in 1953. The Modern Language Association also called upon Schirokauer again and again for assistance in the work of its committees. At the December meeting in 1953 he was Chairman of the Medieval Section. The numerous studies which appeared during these last active and richly productive years were chiefly in Schirokauer's special fields of Medieval and Early New High German language and literature. All of them reflect the mature investigator who bases his cautiously drawn conclusions upon overwhelming evidence.

It sometimes happens that scholars of Schirokauer's caliber are rather indifferent as teachers. Schirokauer, however, was an excellent teacher who possessed both depth of insight and the eloquence necessary to transmit the riches of his intellect to others. Both as a scholar and as a human being Schirokauer had few equals. His passing thus leaves us doubly bereft, for we have lost in him not only a scholar in ideas and indefatigable in the pursuit of knowledge, but, more important still, a fine human being who impressed all who ever knew him as a noble-minded man of great fairness and of faultless integrity.

— William H. McClain

EWALD PAUL APPELT

1890-1954

On the 9th of August, 1954, in less than an hour after he had suffered an unexpected heart attack, Professor E. P. Appelt died at the Strong Memorial Hospital of the University of Rochester Medical Center, Rochester, New York. The suddenness with which he passed from their midst, has made his relatives, colleagues, and friends the more sensitive to their loss.

Professor Appelt was born in Jablonka, Germany, on the 17th of January, 1890. He entered the teaching profession in Germany in 1911 and came to the United States in 1923. He had been a member of the Department of German of Indiana University and of the University of Wisconsin before he came to the University of Rochester in 1933. During his tenure at Rochester, he taught in the German School of Middlebury College in the summer of 1935 and in the Weimar-Jena Summer College for American students in Germany in the summer of 1937. From 1940 to the time of his death, he was Chairman of the Department of German at the University of Rochester.

In the United States he carried on his advanced studies under two eminent scholars. At Northwestern University he received his master of arts degree with James Taft Hatfield; at the University of Wisconsin he received his degree of doctor of philosophy with Alexander R. Hohlfeld.

Professor Appelt was deeply concerned with foreign language teaching methods and with the professional training of prospective teachers of German. His scholarly interests were in the field of German civilization and literature. He published twenty-two papers in professional and scholarly journals and was editor and author of seven textbooks. He was also a former associate editor of the *Monatshefte*

and of *Symposium*. Together with the undersigned, he founded the *Jugendpost*, a periodical for students of German which has been published since 1938. He was active in professional organizations, especially in the American Association of Teachers of German, whose first vice-president he was at the time of his death.

When Professor Appelt came to Rochester, he founded a German cultural society and for two decades he was the honored cultural leader of the thousands of Rochester citizens of German birth or descent. During the Goethe bicentennial in 1949, he formed a committee of leading Rochester citizens and raised funds for a Goethe memorial. The sculptor William E. Ehrich of the Memorial Arts Gallery and the University of Rochester, created a monument which now stands in Rochester's Highland Park as a lasting reminder of Professor Appelt's civic and cultural activities.

For many years Professor Appelt was active as a writer, interpreting German civilization and literature in popular articles for German-language publications in America. During the last several months of his life, he began writing about American ways for periodicals in Germany.

Professor Appelt was a modest man, an unselfish and kind councillor and leader. He will be missed by his former students, by his colleagues and friends in his profession, and by innumerable citizens of the city of Rochester who had come to depend on his leadership.

—Arthur M. Hanhardt

IN MEMORIAM HERMANN B. ALMSTEDT

Complications following a fall in July which fractured his hip caused the death of Hermann B. Almstedt, on September 12, 1954.

Professor Almstedt was born in St. Louis, Missouri, on December 26, 1872, attended Lutheran parochial schools and seminaries, and received his bachelor's degree from the University of Missouri in 1895, where he was made a member of Phi Beta Kappa. He took his Ph.D. degree at the University of Chicago in 1900. After a short time of teaching in Chicago, he returned to the University of Missouri where he stayed until his retirement in 1943, heading the department for over thirty years. For several years he served as secretary of the American Association of Teachers of German.

Professor Almstedt's great interest was Indo-European philology, especially the study of Sanskrit.

A number of sabbatical leaves were spent in Europe, and about 1900, Professor Almstedt became acquainted with the young literary pacemakers of Germany. The Hart Brothers, Flaischlen, and other names were often mentioned by him. A close friendship connected him with Andreas Heusler. Both were accomplished musicians, Heusler playing the violin and Almstedt the piano.

In his early teaching days in the University of Missouri, Professor Almstedt was active in musical affairs, conducting the students glee club and sponsoring university concerts.

During a leave of absence in 1937, Professor and Mrs. Almstedt took a trip around the world which lasted over a year, and students

and friends profited from the impressions the travelers brought home.

In his long career as a teacher of German, Professor Almstedt earned the gratitude of many students. They remembered him as a forceful and dramatic pedagogue. Among his colleagues in other universities he had many friends and he kept up the friendship through a vigorous correspondence. Many of them will miss his letters.

— H. B.

CHICAGO FOLKLORE PRIZE

The CHICAGO FOLKLORE PRIZE was awarded at the 1954 Spring Convocation of the University of Chicago to Dr. Warren E. Roberts of the English Department of Indiana University. He had submitted his Ph.D. dissertation (Indiana University, Department of Folklore, 1953), entitled: AARNE-THOMPSON TYPE 480 IN WORLD TRADITION: A COMPARATIVE FOLKLORE STUDY. This year the Prize carried with it an award of one hundred dollars.

Honorable mention was given at the same time to three other entries: to Professor Charles Speroni of the University of California-Los Angeles for his *The Italian Wellerism to the End of the Seventeenth Century* (1953); to Dr. Joseph Svövérfy of the Irish Folklore Commission, University College, Dublin, for his *St. Christopher Studies: 1. Zur Christophorus-Legende. 2. Folk Beliefs and Medieval Hymns* (manuscript); and to Dr. Margaret Lantis for her "Nunivak Eskimo Personality As Revealed In The Mythology," *Anthropological Papers of the University of Alaska*, II (1953), 109-174.

— Helena M. Gamer

BOOK REVIEWS

Wilhelm Waiblinger in Italy.

By Lawrence S. Thompson. *University of North Carolina Studies in the Germanic Languages and Literatures*, Nr. 9. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1953. Pp. X and 105. \$3.00.

The immediate aim of this investigation, "to analyse and classify Waiblinger's comments on various aspects of Italy," is accomplished in an orderly and lucid series of chapters on art, literature, and music, the landscape, the people, antiquity, the Renaissance, and Catholicism. The author also achieves one of the wider objectives announced in his preface, to illustrate "the importance of Italy as a source of literary inspiration during the early nineteenth century." It is more questionable whether he succeeds in, or even makes a sustained effort at giving Waiblinger "a definitive position as a German author." However, the investigation helps to correct the popular conception of Waiblinger "as a second-rate Byron with all the Englishman's vices and none of his virtues"; it would seem that his share of either is decidedly limited, although there is something Byronic in his restlessness, his frank sensuality, and his romantic experience of ancient ruins as a symbol of human mutability.

Dr. Thompson convinces the reader that Waiblinger's temperament was matured and his poetic talents enriched by his years in Italy; that they satisfied a fundamental need of his personality; and that in the process he developed a deeper sympathy for, and broader, more intimate knowledge of modern Italian life and character than can

be accredited to his German contemporaries and precursors. The evidence that Waiblinger achieved any significant advance in German appreciation of ancient and Renaissance civilization or Italian literature is much less impressive. Perhaps the worst example of Dr. Thompson's exaggerated estimate of Waiblinger in such respects is the statement that "Waiblinger perceived clearly the point of distinction between the two great painters of the Renaissance when he spoke of 'sanfter Raffael and harter Michelangelo'" (p. 83). Even Wackenroder reached much more substantial insights than this (or those of the verses cited in the same context)! Waiblinger's intimate observations of *improvisatori* no doubt enriched German appreciation of Italian folk poetry, but it is unwarranted to suggest that the earlier German romanticists were unacquainted with extemporaneous creation in folk literature (p. 50). How haphazardly Waiblinger must have studied the history of Italian drama becomes evident when we read of his interest in the "lively Venetian sketches in the local vernacular" of "Goldoni, who revived and remodeled the old *commedia dell'arte*" (p. 33). The failure of Dr. Thompson to mention Gozzi in this connection or elsewhere results from the limitations of Waiblinger's knowledge, but it is regrettable that so fragmentary and distorted a conception of Venetian theatrical history is not presented more critically.

In the last analysis, the significance of Dr. Thompson's study must rest upon the influence which Waiblinger's poems, stories, and sketches on Italy may have exerted upon his contemporaries. Dr. Thompson concludes by raising this question, but he diffidently avoids wrestling with it. Would it not have been rewarding to explore the communication of Waiblinger's impressions to such contemporary authors as his friend Mörike? The possibility that Waiblinger's warm appreciation of Italian color, rhythm, and vitality may have helped stimulate the aquatic carnival in *Mozart auf der Reise nach Prag* is nowhere mentioned.

Washington University.

—Raymond Immerwahr

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